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I. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS – ARE ALLIANCES A 
FUNCTION OF AN EXTERNAL THREAT? 
Current European-U.S. transatlantic relations represent the heritage of a large 
number of international alliances and institutions that were founded at a time when there 
was a bipolar world, a bipolar world dominated by the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The worldwide confrontation of those two contrary ideological superpowers was 
already indicated at the end of World War II. Both superpowers were a direct result of the 
outcome of the war. Today, fourteen years after the end of the Cold War, some national 
leaders question the continued viability of these international alliances and institutions. In 
their references to international relations, realist and liberal theorists reflect significant 
ideological differences, which have considerable influence on transatlantic relations. 
My thesis will consider a central question pertaining to the future of transatlantic 
relations between Europe and the United States: Will the presence, or absence, of an 
external threat to the countries involved be the deciding factor in their willingness to 
cooperate in security alliances? It is a significant question, and investigating it provides a 
better understanding of future uses of alliances and their role in world politics. 
My argument focuses on alliances that were established in response to pressing 
security risks, not economic, environmental, or human rights issues. In subsequent 
Chapters, I outline the significance of the central question, outline my basic argument, 
and describe my theoretical methodology. 
Recently, two specific historical occurrences decisively modified the security 
landscape worldwide: the end of the Cold War (1991) and almost two decades of violent, 
deadly acts of international terrorism. Since the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which made former satellite states suddenly 
independent, numerous eastern European countries have applied for membership in 
NATO and the European Union. At the same time, organizations such as, especially, 
NATO and the United Nations, have had to deal with the competitive and often 
contradictory interests of member states. 
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Currently, we are witnessing fundamental changes in the environment and climate 
of international relations, due primarily to the obvious hegemony of the United States, 
economically, culturally, and militarily. 
The United States seems to have one main reason for maintaining its membership 
in international alliances: such collective organizations provide a vehicle for the United 
States to exercise its predominant influence in the world. In addition, its continued 
membership offers the possibility that the burden and cost of maintaining worldwide 
order can be spread widely over many countries. 
The consequent international stability is important for the maintenance of trade 
relations and, furthermore, to prevent the emergence of another superpower. In the Initial 
Draft of the Pentagon’s Defense Planning Guidance it states that “we must account 
sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage them from 
challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or economic 
order” and “we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from 
even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”1 Alliances permit weaker states to 
restrict the action of stronger states. In taking into consideration these concurring 
interests it is difficult to find a common solution if there is not an overall threat that 
forces the states to combine their interests. 
In this thesis, alliances are defined in the manner proposed by John Maersheimer: 
“a formal agreement or set of rules or norms that regulate behavior and outline certain 
obligations.”2 The presence of the alliances is a constant reality in the environment of 
international relations; however, the benefits of the alliances are difficult to quantify. 
Based on their principles and requirements, most alliances were initiated during the cold 
war era, and the present lack of an external threat similar to the Cold War Soviet-U.S. 
threat of nuclear war has served to reduce the inclination to consent and the level of 
cooperation among alliance participants. 
 
1 Patrick Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plans for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower World,“ New 
York Times, March 8, 1992. 
2 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol 
19, No. 3, 34. 
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A common key assumption is that, in the near future, there will be no serious 
external power capable of threatening Western nations and their alliances. I argue, 
however, that the lack of an overarching threat makes these alliances less likely to 
maintain cohesion. My hypothesis is that, for any given time period, the absence or 
presence of a significant worldwide threat will dictate how Western alliances function. 
This argument is not intended replace the ideological debate as to what role alliances can 
play in a bipolar world. The expectation in this investigation is that the character and the 
behavior of alliances over the last fifty years have shown a close relationship between 
threat and the capacity to act as a cohesive alliance. 
If an external threat of a certain kind has solidified these alliances, then the lack of 
similar threat may serve to dissolve these bonds and toleration of internal differences. 
Such developments do not happen overnight. Just as it took time to consolidate the 
relations in an alliance, it will take challenges and readjustments to subjugate states 
autonomy in favor of institutional profit and the common good.. If alliances are shaped 
for mutual use and benefit and it can be shown that their behavior has no relation to the 
balance of power, then the argument is not valid. Furthermore, it can be predicted that the 
willingness of states to forego relative gains to the benefit of the alliance will decrease 
which can be, for example, economic aid, trade preferences, or technology exports. 
External threats comprise the independent variable and are directly related to the 
ability of an alliance to cooperate. western alliances had a common enemy during the 
Cold War that made cooperation necessary in order to maintain the balance of power. 
While there were high and low points of tension during this era, the overall perceived 
necessity for unity remained. With the lack of the Cold War enemy, the alliances are now 
challenged by internal threats. Without an external threat, alliances become plagued by 
defection and dissent over collective decisions and individual preferences. Their can 
cause alliances to suffer inefficacy and may lead to eventual division. In the absence of 
an external threat defensive realism takes over. As Kenneth N. Waltz put it, “In 
international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance it.”3 In 
short, states will balance against a hegemonic member. After the end of the Cold War the 
 
3 Kenneth N. Waltz, “America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective,” PS, 
December 1991, 669. 
U.S. government recognized this problem immediately and stated that the United States 
“must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage 
them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or 
economic order.”4 France seems to perceive itself as a counterweight to the United States 
in Europe, as the French minister for foreign affairs, Hubert Védrine, in 1998 stressed 
that “we cannot accept a unipolar political world and therefore we will fight for a 
multipolar world.”5 To reach this goal France will attempt to influence and infuse its 
special domestic interests into the European Union’s security and defense policies.6 
However, in the event an external threat does arise, like the attack on the World 
Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, alliances are able to overcome self- 
interests and respond in a mutually beneficial manner. Lacking such a threat it becomes 
impossible to reach congruence. These factors hinder the profitability and capacity of 
alliances to act in unison. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Progression of Transatlantic Relations 
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4 Patrick Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plans for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower World,“ New 
York Times, March 8, 1992. 
5 Matthias Rüb. Der Atlantische Graben: Amerika und Europa auf getrennten Wegen (Wien: Paul 
Zsolnay Verlag, 2004), 49. 
6 Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins, eds., 91. 
5 
The external threat is the defining variable. When a threat exists countries work 
together, if not they disperse (Figure 1). Figure 1 shows the course of relations between 
the United States and the European Union in the last decade. To demonstrate the validity 
of the theory, a detailed historical analysis is necessary, as well as an evaluation of 
existing alliances like NATO and the UN. 
How transatlantic relations will develop in the future depends on the independent 
variable, or external threat. For a better understanding, it’s important to describe the 
pertinent time periods, as each period serves as a binary test of my theory. 
This hypothesis expects to discover how the presence or absence of an external 
threat dictates how transatlantic relations function. The continuing durability of western 
alliances is an important issue for the future. The presence or absence of an external 
threat defines whether or not Europe and the United States will cooperate in security 
alliances. Without, a threat such as the Soviet threat of the Cold War, will those alliances 
cooperate and overcome their internal differences? Realists would argue that the alliances 
will fail. 
Given the U.S. dominance of the current unipolar world, alliances are in the 
danger of potential collapse under the weight of internal differences, as individual states 
lack the incentives to cooperate without a common external threat. As stated earlier future 
collective agreements among alliance members will not result in more cooperation, but in 
increased tension regarding future conflicts. This thesis will is based on a survey of 
pertinent primary and secondary scholarly literature on the topic: government 
publications, documented policies, and regional experts. The thesis analyzes the current 
transatlantic relations, examines the interests of the main actors, and makes 
recommendations how the relations may be improved. 
Chapter II is a brief summary of the history of transatlantic relations after World 
War II, when security and stability in the West were connected to a number of 
institutions. NATO, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are only a few of them. I focus on, the EU and 
NATO, which bound the democracies together and facilitated political community. 
6 
                                                
In Chapter III I compare the U.S. Security Strategy with the European Security 
Strategy, which can be seen as a response to the U.S. Security Strategy. One section 
analyzes the differences between them and their impact on transatlantic relations. I also 
describe the transition from the “Weinberger Doctrine” (1984) to the “Rumsfeld 
Doctrine” and U.S. military “transformation” (beginning ca. 2001). “Embracing common 
liberal democratic norms and operating within interlocking multilateral institutions, the 
United States, western Europe, and, later, Japan built an enduring postwar order.”7 
Transformation breaks with this tradition and can be seen as one of the key aspects for 
the deterioration in transatlantic relations. 
Chapter IV examines the motivation behind French and German interests, because 
both countries, the largest members of the European Union, are key actors who influence 
the foreign policy of Europe and determine which direction the European Union will go. 
France is interested in global acting and uses the European Union to achieve that goal. 
French foreign policy is interested in a multipolar world in which France wants to 
balance the United States. This is not in Germany’s interest.8 This chapter analyzes how 
close partners in the European security-policy environment, approach and handle 
European security. How the Europeans address questions of war and peace influences 
security not only in Europe, but also throughout the greater world. 
Chapter V assesses the transatlantic relationship in terms of security policy. As a 
basis, I analyze the values and security-policy interests of sovereign participants within 
NATO. Subsequently, I evaluate the particular characteristics of the transatlantic relation 
as institutionalized within NATO before the Prague summit of November 21, 2002. The 
change to the new NATO is reflected in the responsibility of the Alliance for security and 
stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and its corresponding adaptation of the tasks it will 
most likely fulfill. 
Chapter VI will attempt to draw conclusions as to whether or not Europe and the 
U.S. will be successful in their efforts to cooperate in security alliances. Are alliances a 
function of an external threat and what are the repercussions on transatlantic relations? 
 
7 Paul Berman, “Terror and Liberalism,” (New York: Norton 2003), 85. 
8 John Lloyd, “How Anti-Americanism Betrays the Left,” Observer, March 17, 2003. 
7 
The chapter will also make recommendations for how each side can improve transatlantic 
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II. HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
A. THE COLD WAR PERIOD (1945-1991) 
The Cold War was waged from 1946 until the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 
1991. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the world’s two superpowers 
as a direct result of World War II. A possible worldwide confrontation between these two 
powers loomed at the end of the war and began to appear in headlines almost 
immediately, as the confrontation infringed more and more on Europe itself.9 According 
to Robert O. Paxton, there is no doubt that the insatiable political aims of Stalin after 
World War II could only have been curtailed by a countervailing United States power. 
While the security of the Soviet state and its satellite Communist regimes had priority in 
1945, Stalin’s expansionist ambitions grew during the early years of the Cold War.10  
This chapter argues that the threat of Soviet Union expansionism after 1945 was 
the driving force behind the increasing cohesion and later integration of western 
European states. Because both were suffering under the Soviet threat, it became possible 
for such historical enemies as France and Germany to join the same alliance and lay the 
cornerstone for the European Union. Nevertheless, it took no less than a decade before 
security and stability in the West would be understood to be tied to a number of 
institutions. In this chapter I focus on the European theater and on the EU and NATO, 
which bound the democracies together and facilitated the political community. 
The second part of the chapter turns to the post Cold War period to investigate if 
and how the disappearance of the external threat caused the deterioration of relations 
between United States and Europe. While the United States significantly increased its 
military expenditures, Europe strove to harvest the so called peace dividend. 
Unfortunately, such an arrangement was not in the United States’ interest; it 
wanted military “burden sharing.” In reality, “burden sharing” in the United States sense 
meant “burden shifting” to the European nations. They were reserved to load this burden. 
 
9 Deutscher Bundestag, Fragen an die deutsche Geschichte: Ideen, Kräfte und Entscheidungen, 17th 
ed. (Bonn: Bundesdruckerei, 1993), 368.  
10 Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century, 4th ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 
2004), 471. 
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When the Cold War ended, Germany was the only country in Europe which was 
able to present a so-called “Gesamtkonzept,” or roadmap for the future, outlining how 
European integration should continue. This concept anticipated a “deepening” and 
“widening” of the European Union.11 It showed that the old “German question” had been 
solved, “that Europe’s supranational cooperation was no freak by-product of the Soviet 
threat but a permanent rejection of a two-millennium history of bloodshed.”12 
 
B. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE IN THE COLD WAR 
PERIOD 
In the peacetime between WWI and WWII, the United States practiced an 
isolationist foreign policy, but that ended with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Isolationism had not, however, inhibited the U.S. “from opening the door to Asia in the 
nineteenth century, from the economic internationalism that followed, or from the 
interventions of 1917 and 1941.”13 Obviously, United States had become an active world 
power long before the end of WWII, but the U.S. security situation after the war was 
different. As a direct result of the rapid technological development of long-distance 
airplanes, airplane carriers, submarines, and atomic weapons, the United States mainland 
was more vulnerable than ever before. These changes came to dominate the thinking of 
United States policy makers, inspiring them to take a more active role in world policies. 
In the aftermath of World War II, the United States was the only remaining power able 
“to contain the Soviet threat.”14 By 1947, the United States and the Soviet Union had 
dissolved their alliance because of deep ideological differences. The breakdown of the 
relationship was a direct result of Stalin’s violation of the 1945 Yalta accords, the violent 
influence of Soviet-dominated governments on unwilling eastern Europe countries, and 
an aggressive Soviet expansionism.15 The Soviet Union displaced its borders west and, in 
 
11 “Deepening the integration of its members into the Community and widening the membership.” 
Elisabeth Pond, Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance. (Pittsburgh: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2004), xiii. 
12 Ibid, xiv. 
13 Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State. 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1998), 2. 
14 Ibid, 2. 
15 Robert O. Paxton, 519. 
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the process, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, parts of Finland, East Prussia, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Romania lost their independence. Poland was moved westward and, 
as was also the case in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, 
Albania and East-Germany, its governments were “controlled by rigid communist 
regimes.”16 These events inspired Winston Churchill in 1946 to profess that an “iron 
curtain” had fallen in Europe to separate the eastern from the western hemisphere.17 The 
United States tried to play the leading role in Europe and form the western countries 
together into a bloc, but the means of this bloc-building differed radically from that of the 
Soviet Union. Stalin needed the wealth of eastern European countries for reconstruction, 
and he feared he would loose control of eastern Europe unless he was able to govern it 
more directly.18 The countries had no freely elected governments, no pluralistic state 
system, and no openess to western free trade and travel.19 
The United States reinforced the cohesion of the western European countries 
mainly by indirect incentives. The Marshall plan, constructed as help for self-help, 
earmarked this kind of policy. Washington impelled the western countries to “morally 
and politically” join together and, in the process, initiated the beginning of European 
integration.20 The new post-war United States foreign policy of a world without barriers 
to trade and investment stood in marked contrast to Stalin’s closed spheres of influence. 
There were, however, early disagreements between the United States and its 
western European allies. Since Yalta, the United States had tried to convince Great 
Britain and France that it was time to grant independence to their colonies, but the French 
feared that the United States harbored hidden ambitions to replace the French economic 
presence, especially in Indochina.21 These conflicts were largely caused by United States 
foreign policy, which established a worldwide free market, with the dollar as the 
strongest currency, and where American companies were able to act freely. 
 
16 Robert O. Paxton , 516. 
17 Deutscher Bundestag, 368. 
18 Robert O. Paxton, 520. 
19 Ibid, 471. 
20 Ludolf Herbst, Option für den Westen: Vom Marshallplan bis zum deutsch-französischen Vertrag, 
(München: DTV, 1989), 8. 
21 Robert O. Paxton, 475. 
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However, the Soviet Union was strong enough to set up its own sphere of 
influence where Western trade, companies, and money had no access. By September 
1949, the Soviet Union had successfully tested an atomic bomb, and the availability of 
nuclear weapons on both sides made war unfavorable. Each side possessed an 
overwhelming capability of annihilating the enemy. Peace was impossible because each 
side claimed universal ideological legitimacy.22 Instead, the United States accused the 
Soviet Union of seeking to expand its communist ideology around the world. The Soviet 
Union supported worldwide movements for colonial independence and ethnic separation. 
At the same time, the Soviet Union charged the United States with practicing 
imperialism. Both sides struggled for the enlargement of their respective political 
hemispheres, especially for the upper hand in the emerging new nations in Africa and 
Asia.23 The means by which these kinds of wars were fought were coups, guerilla-
warfare, and civil wars supported openly or covered by the opponents. The Cold War era 
was characterized by mutual distrust, suspicion, and misunderstandings by both the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Cold war techniques were “economic penetration, 
intellectual persuasion, and subversive propaganda as well as more traditional forms of 
political and military influence” which were used to weaken the enemy.24 
The Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and 
countless proxy wars, mainly in third-world countries, were occasions when the tensions 
between the ideologies turned into hot war. In sum, the United States objective was to 
prevent Soviet expansionism by mainly defensive measures, based on a network of treaty 
organizations led by the United States containment policy. Fortunately, the major world 
powers never entered armed conflict directly against each other. Nevertheless, the fear of 
a confrontation in central Europe welded the western European nations together. Their 
need to defend western Europe in case of a military conflict with the Soviet Union was 
the main reason they accepted the leadership role of the United States as a protective 
power in Europe. 
 
 
22 Robert O. Paxton, 533. 
23 Ibid, 534. 
24 Ibid, 534. 
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C. EUROPE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE COLD WAR 
The hot spot, and therefore United States top priority, in the beginning cold war 
between 1945 and 1949 was western Europe, particularly Germany, where a zonal border 
matched the separation between the western and Soviet zones of occupation and divided 
the former German capital, Berlin. This development loomed shortly after Yalta. The 
victorious powers decided that Germany had to be dismembered, but did not lay down 
the specific way to dismember it. Instead, occupation zones were specified that were 
supposed to be controlled by a single unified Allied Control Commission.25 The 
Conference of Potsdam, from July to August 1945, was unable to solve the problem. 
Calls for the economical unity of Germany and for the remake of a democratic political 
order were vague and only partially acceptable to the different conceivabilities of the 
victor powers. This is why the unified Allied Control Commission was unable to work 
properly. Over time, the real decision-making power came to be held more and more by 
the chiefs of the military governments of the occupation zones. All four zones realized 
their own aims and interests, all of which were fundamentally different from the others, 
but only in their own particular zone. While the United States and Great Britain wanted to 
restore the German economy as fast as possible, the Soviet Union and France tried to 
extract as much benefit as they could out of Germany in order to rebuilt their destroyed 
countries. The motivation behind the United States/British plan was clear: without a 
recovered German economy, the United States would have “to feed and supply Germans 
and Europeans for a long time.”26 On the other hand, the Soviet claim for reparations and 
its attempts to merge parts or even the whole of Germany into its reach caused tension 
between the victor powers and prepared the ground for a German “Westbindung.” Paxton 
stresses that “from the American point of view, the Soviets were simply stripping 
Germany of the means to live in a free enterprise world.”27 
However, after the unsuccessful conferences of the foreign ministers in April in 
Moscow, and in November/December 1947 in London, American leaders took the 
initiative and started to support the anti-Communist governments in Turkey, Greece, and 
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South Korea and to rebuild the destroyed European states as a counterweight to the 
Soviet bloc. With the support of Great Britain, and later France, the western occupation 
zones of Germany were brought into this program. The Marshall Plan built a functioning 
economic system for western Europe, as economic aid ended the dollar shortage and 
stimulated private investment for reconstruction. For the United States, the Marshall plan 
eradicated the remaining symptoms of the prewar economical crisis and transitioned the 
United States economy to over-production by establishing, expanding, and maintaining a 
European demand for American exports.28 Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, which 
were initially interested in taking part in this program, were actively detained from doing 
so by the Soviet Union. The division of Europe was unstoppable and, despite the vigor 
and passion of their attempt, German efforts to prevent their own partition failed.29 
Above all else, the French government was intent on preventing a German 
reunification.30 
After the failed Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1949, the frontiers and boundaries 
became frozen throughout Europe and remained so for a generation. The formerly 
powerful European nations lost their influence as the two newly emerged superpowers 
circled each other. While eastern European countries were suppressed under Soviet rule, 
western European nations became dependant on the United States and its umbrella of 
protecting power. To balance the rising threat from the Soviet Union, the United States 
extended its military influence within Europe, and, in April 1949, western Europe and 
North America joined together to sign the Treaty of Washington, which forged the 
foundation of NATO.31 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, initially an alliance of 
twelve states (1949), faced 175 Soviet divisions massed in eastern Europe and were later 
organized by the Warsaw Pact (1955).32 Hidden political and economic agendas about 
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German rearmament existed in Washington, London, and Bonn even before the Korea 
war. Among the European public, this topic had been discussed since 1948. The Berlin 
blockade, the explosion of the first Soviet nuclear bomb in the autumn of 1949, as well as 
the victory of the communists in China (1949) intensified those discussions. It was only a 
question of time before a nuclear stalemate between the United States and the Soviet 
Union would increase the probability of a conventional war. The armament industry of 
the Soviet Union was predominant, in particular if China is added to the communist 
potential.33 Because the French army was engaged in Indochina and Great Britain’s army 
was similarly active in Malaya, it became desirable to augment the standing European 
forces with German troops. The United States, especially, put political pressure on Paris, 
which still refused to consent to German rearmament. In September 1950, the United 
States confronted the west European nations with an alternative, to rearm their armies and 
be reinforced by U.S. troops, or no reinforcement by U.S. troops in Europe. Under the 
influence of the Korean War, this triggered fears in western Europe and enabled German 
rearmament.34  
The failed French-German project of the EPC led to the initiation into NATO, to 
the end of the occupation in Germany, and, to Germany’s subsequent military 
rearmament. Greece and Turkey became signatory members of the NATO treaty in 1952, 
the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.35 To increase stability in 
the region, the United States also supported the idea of an integrated and sovereign 
Europe which would be “more than just an extension of United States influence.”36 The 
two superpowers confronted each other, one finger on the weapon which could destroy 
the world, across a wall that cut Europe into two parts. From 1952-1959, American 
intervention against the Soviet divisions would mean “massive retaliation” on the 
battleground of Europe as a massive nuclear response in case of an Soviet advance into 
western Europe. During that time, western Europeans were threatened by what Arnold 
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Toynbee called: “Annihilation without representation.”37 “Massive retaliation” was 
replaced by “graduated deterrence,” which did nothing to change the disadvantages faced 
by Central Europe, which would still be the battlefield of a nuclear confrontation. Many 
Europeans saw in this development “a growing reluctance of the United States to use 
nuclear force.”38 De Gaulle was the first European leader to articulate this sentiment 
officially by advancing the idea of an independent French nuclear force.39 Also, the 
German Great Coalition (1966-1969) did not want to sign the Nuclear Proliferation 
Treaty. In March 1963, the United States proposed a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). 
This proposal was unsuccessful (1964) because of French contradictions.40 
However, the destruction and the sorrow of two world wars was the direct result 
of political differences between France and Germany and the cold war system of bloc 
confrontation in Europe led to the discernment of a new beginning between the two 
countries. The idea of an European Economic Community in 1957 (Treaty of Rome), the 
early predecessor of the European Union (EU), was based on improved trade and 
economic development between member states in a Europe still struggling with the 
outcome of WWII. The fundamental objective of these efforts was rapprochement 
between Germany and its former enemies to support stability on the European 
continent.41 The idea was that strong binding would prevent a revival of a German 
“Sonderweg” between East and West, which would cause a “power vacuum,” and tempt 
the Soviets to strive for hegemony in Middle Europe.42 Already, in the early 1950s the 
United States recognized clearly that efforts for European integration would fail if there 
was no long-term solution to the French–German antagonism. Hence, the United States` 
European policy included the furtherance of reconciliation between the two countries. An 
integrated West-Europe without the Federal Republic of Germany would have been 
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neither economically nor strategically maintainable.43 For Washington, west European 
integration including the Federal Republic of Germany meant the following: First, a 
reinforcement against the Soviet threat, second, to anchor Germany to the west; and third, 
the United States recognized the important role that Germany could play in the 
predefinition of the course of the European Community (EC).44 Jolyon Howorth argues 
that, historically, “From the middle of the nineteenth century, French security policy 
constantly oscillated between, on the one hand, the attractions but inconvenience of 
alliances and, on the other hand, the status but inadequacy of independence.”45 De Gaulle 
decided in 1966 to remove France from the integrated military command of NATO. 
Problems occurred when de Gaulle’s policy queried the U.S.-European concept and 
presented his French model for European order. Unfortunately, nobody seriously thought 
that France after WWII would be more than a medium-rank power.46 I analyze this 
problem in detail in Chapter IV. 
 
1. Brandt’s Policy of Détente 
The policy of détente (1963-1969) tried to overcome the deadlock between the 
two power blocs. This kind of realist policy ignored the interests of central Europe and 
attempted to inspire change through rapprochement. Willi Brandt and Egon Bahr were 
the main political actors behind this movement, and their policy of “Ostpolitik” led to a 
new relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union and, as 
a result, to eastern Europe. The idea of “Ostpolitik” was born out of the frustration of a 
divided country, located on the battlefield between two superpowers, trying to find a 
peaceful solution for the future. Brandt’s aim, therefore, was to dismantle the wall that 
had been erected across central Europe.47 He recognized that the key to a change of the 
relationship to eastern Europe lay in Moscow. With the Moscow Treaty of August 1970, 
he acknowledged the existing German frontiers. Germany now had three options of 
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political orientation: the Atlantic, the European, and the Russian. The European powers, 
however, feared détente would only lead to the revival of the “German problem.” They 
were apprehensive as to the potential consequences of reviving German neutralism and 
an independent German policy balanced between East and West. France and Great 
Britain feared the ghost of a “new Rapallo” with German military cooperation with 
Russia.48 Paxton argues that the “opening of the Soviet bloc to western European and 
American economic penetration was a silent revolution of the 1970`s.” Western European 
countries sold advanced equipment, food stuffs, and consumer goods to the Soviet Union 
and its satellites. The United States was the main foreign supplier of Russian grain, but, 
nevertheless, the military threat persisted. 
 
2. The Euromissiles Crisis 
The Euromissiles crisis was much more than a political debate. Already in 1962, 
Helmut Schmidt, the German chancellor from 1974-1982, discerned “The Soviet Union 
is now a power of unprecedented and commanding military potential and shows every 
sign of being aware of this advantageous change in the situation.”49 Germany and other 
western European countries feared that the American nuclear guarantee for western 
Europe could erode in case of a strategic nuclear superiority in ICBMs, which might 
allow the Soviets to launch limited conventional attacks. The situation deteriorated in the 
early 1970s, when the Soviets continued to deploy more and more nuclear weapons. 
SALT I (1969-1972) and SALT II (1972-1979) were attempts, to reduce the nuclear arms 
arsenals.50 The Soviet Union and the United States had an interest in doing so, because 
the maintenance of huge arsenals of nuclear weapons was expensive and reduced the 
available expenditures for more modern weapons. However, the central assumption of 
1975 was that the Soviets were able to launch a surprise attack on western Europe 
“practically with no preparation time left.”51 The nuclear potential of France and Great 
Britain was an additional risk factor for the Soviet Union, but did not counterbalance 
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their medium-range weapons.52 Economical and technical progress identifiable in terms 
of Soviet nuclear rockets, airplanes, ships, and submarines and worldwide maneuvers of 
the Soviet Fleet reinforced the fear of a Soviet attack. While the western European 
economies were suffering the effects of an second oil crisis (1979), it seemed that the 
Soviet industry was growing. The strong dependence of western European economies on 
oil from third-world countries caused a double risk. Oil deliveries could be interrupted or 
delayed.53 The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (1980) shocked the western world again. 
The shift to détente under heads of state Jimmy Carter, James Callaghan, Helmut 
Schmidt54 and Valéry Giscard d´Estaing turned to a conservative policy change under 
Ronald Reagan (1981), Magret Thatcher (1981), Helmut Kohl (1982), and Francois 
Mitterand (1981). 
The 40th United States President, Ronald Reagan, decided to actively oppose the 
Soviet threat. Reagan planned to confront the Soviets on three fronts: first, the economic, 
which aimed at decreasing Soviet access to high technology; second, the military, 
increasing U.S. defense expenditures, to strengthen the U.S. negotiation position with the 
aim of forcing the Soviet Union to spend more money on defense expenditures; and third, 
the global, by supporting resistance against the Soviet Union throughout the entire 
world.55 
 
3. The Collapse of the Soviet Union 
The collapse of the Soviet Union was, for the free world, an unforeseen event that 
happened in stages. Ronald Reagan’s “zero-tolerance” policy came to fruition as, over 
time, the Soviet Union systematically lost the arms race. For the Soviet Union, several 
unfavorable factors came together: economic stagnation, environmental pollution, 
declining public health, and, most important, citizens` increasing frustration and loss of 
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faith in the Soviet system, which awakened the dissatisfaction of the Soviet Union’s 
populations and its satellites.56 These events became manifest in the reluctance, or 
incapacity, of Soviet authorities to intervene against the break-up of its sphere of power. 
Four main reasons for the relatively fast breakdown can be identified. First, economic 
failure – the net income fell 17 percent in 1991 alone. Second, on April 26, 1986, the 
nuclear power plant in Chernobyl exploded. Many people were killed, 300,000 had to 
leave their homes, millions of others were affected. Third, the Soviet army was not able 
to establish a satellite regime in Afghanistan. That ten-year war (1979-1989) ruined the 
Russian economy, cost heavy casualties, and disclosed the backwardness of the Soviet 
system. And fourth, with Mikhail Gorbachev, a new generation of communist leaders, 
came to power. Gorbachev saw himself as a reformer in instituting his unprecedented 
policy of “openness” (glasnost) and “restructuring” (prerestroika).57 Without Soviet 
backing, the communist regimes in satellite states such as Poland, the Baltic States, 
eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and 
Albania were wiped out within several months.58 A detailed analysis of the reasons why 
the Soviet Union collapsed is a not important for this particular work and, therefore, will 
not be considered further. What is important is that the external threat of conventional 
attack from the Soviet Union was completely removed for eastern and western European 
countries by 1991.59 In December 1991, the Soviet Union was replaced by a Russian 
federation consisting of fourteen more or less independent states.60 
 
D. THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD (1991-2001) 
Shortly before the breakdown of the Soviet Union (1991), the two plus four treaty 
(1990) regulated the details of German reunification. The main conditions outlined in the 
treaty, which provided a continuing commitment to maintaining NATO and the European 
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Community, preventing Germany from developing nuclear capabilities, and encouraging 
general military force reductions, guaranteed the inviolability of borders governed by the 
Helsinki Final Act, and supported a peaceful, gradual, reunification process.61 Germany 
gained its reunification in exchange for deeper European integration and the commitment 
to remain in NATO. To make this transition toward a deeper European integration 
irrevocable, Germany sacrificed its national currency. 
Germany was the only country in Europe that was able to present a so-called 
“Gesamtkonzept”, or roadmap, for the future: how the European integration should 
continue.62 In all reality, however, German leadership in Europe was neither advisable 
nor desired. Instead, the European powers thought how to keep the reviewed unified 
German economic power in the “European basket.” German policy since reunification 
has tried to integrate the old “Mitteleuropa” into the EU and NATO by way of 
enlargement. On the one hand, Germany was a clear winner in the reunification process, 
as this development opened new foreign markets in the East. On the other hand, it had to 
pay billions to alleviate Soviet sins in East Germany, such as inefficient and unprofitable 
industry, a large standing military-force structure, and political and social stratification 
that had handicapped East Germany’s overall development.63  
However difficult and economically challenging the concept of “deepening” the 
integration of its members and “widening” the membership proved to be, it was 
declaredly the aim of the European Union. Deepening the European Union would prove 
to have its limits, which were directly determined by the manifold interests of the nation 
states in Europe. That is why, with the noted exception of the monetary and trade policy 
aspects, the EU remained a relatively loose confederation of nation states. The European 
Single Act of 1986 changed all of this. It proposed the transfer of labor, capital, and 
services; a single European currency; and a common foreign and military policy.64 
Finally, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) created the European Union and initiated not only 
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the European Monetary Fund but also a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).65 
“Widening” of the European Union was important to project security in and around 
Europe and to give eastern European countries struggling with building up new 
constitutional regimes, social societies, economies, and value systems a chance for 
stability. The rapid economical and political success of transitioning eastern European 
states in the 1990s finally made their membership in the EU realistic. 
At the same time, the United States continued to view itself as a “European 
power,” a status it was determined to maintain, regardless of whether or not the Bush and 
Clinton administrations had an interest in convincing European governments to take over 
leadership in Europe and care for security on the European continent.66 Indeed, the failed 
EU attempts to end the Yugoslav Civil War (1989-1996) had shown that it was 
“dangerous and unrealistic” to believe that United States leadership was no longer needed 
in Europe.67 The Gulf War of 1991 had unequivocally shown the superiority and the 
capability gap between United States and European forces. The European impotence in 
its efforts to end the Yugoslav Civil War showed the European inability to act 
independently of the United States. 
Another arena in which the Europeans might pool their resources, and where the 
United States used to occupy a leadership role, was NATO. At the Brussels summit in 
1994, the sixteen member countries reaffirmed that NATO was open for membership by 
other European states.68 Thanks to the integration of eastern Europe countries into the EU 
and NATO, currently, there are no military conflicts that, which would necessitate an 
American engagement expected in Europe. The EU and NATO enlargements are further 
steps toward enhancing security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic 
area. 
At NATO’s 1996 Berlin summit, an agreement was reached that outlined 
provisions whereby the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) would rely on 
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NATO assets. The aim was to be able to conduct military missions in autonomous ways. 
The so-called “Petersberg Tasks” empowered the West European Union to carry out a 
modest set of military missions,69 but the 1999 Kosovo campaign not only showed the 
European military weakness again, but also the United States willingness for unilateral 
action. Left behind was a slight sense that the Europeans had hampered the United States 
efforts to destroy the Milosevic regime.70 The experiences from the Kosovo war were the 
main motivation for EU decisions to build up a 60,000-men-strong rapid reaction force, a 
military and security committee, and a military staff.71 I will focus on this topic in detail 
in Chapter V. 
This development of European military capabilities was undertaken with restraint. 
On the one hand, the United States criticized the lack of EU capabilities, and, on the other 
hand, it feared that decoupling from NATO could cause double capabilities, 
discrimination of against non-EU but NATO-member countries, and the loss of 
leadership through NATO.72 I will focus on this topic in detail in Chapter V. 
On September 12, 2001, less than twenty-four hours after the terrorist attacks on 
the United States, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s governing body, invoked Article 
V of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the Alliance’s history. In doing so, 
NATO declared that the attack against the United States was to be regarded as an attack 
against all nineteen members of the NATO community. This invocation of Article V 
demonstrated NATO’s intention to play a role in the response to the attacks of 09/11, 
and, in reaction to requests for assistance from the United States, NATO allies have taken 
several measures to assist in the global war on terrorism. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Europe’s former foreign policy consensus held a relatively simple view of the 
world, in which the Soviet Union and its satellites were seen as aggressors who sought to 
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expand and take over parts of the free world. The objective of the traditional consensus 
was to prevent Soviet expansionism by means of mainly defensive measures based on a 
network of treaty organizations guided by the United States containment policy. The 
impotence of the European nations, ability to defend themselves against the Soviet threat 
made them dependent upon United States protective power. The idea of a European 
Economic Community was based on improved trade and economic development between 
member states in a Europe still struggling with the outcome of World War II. The 
fundamental objective of those efforts was rapprochement between Germany and its 
former enemies to support stability on the European continent. This rapprochement was 
possible because an external threat forced France and Germany to combine their interests. 
Détente was an attempt to decrease tensions between East and West and, indeed, 
the policy was able to open up new markets, even though this was never the real intention 
of Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr. Quite the reverse: while “Europeans and Americans 
shared hopes that détente would somehow lessen the threat of nuclear war, the practical 
effects of détente were to emphasize divergences between Western Europe and the 
United States.”73 
I have argued that the threat of Soviet Union expansionism was the reason for the 
increasing cohesion and later integration of the western European states after 1945. 
Because they were both suffering under the Soviet threat, it was possible for historical 
enemies like France and Germany to join the same alliance and, in the process, lay the 
cornerstone for the European Union and a new, peaceful order between nation-states in 
Europe. The concept of deepening and widening the European Union was important to 
project security in and around Europe and to give eastern European countries struggling 
to build up new constitutional regimes, social societies, economies, and value systems a 
chance for stability. It showed that the old “German question” had been solved and “that 
Europe’s supranational cooperation was no freak by-product of the Soviet threat but a 
permanent rejection of a two-millennium history of bloodshed.”74 In the case of the 
European Union, the lack of an external threat did not reduce the inclination of consent or 
the level of cooperation among the participants. With respect to the transatlantic alliance,  
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it can be determined that, during the Cold War Period, the cohesion was high, despite 
troubles. But, with the lack of an external threat, consent and the degree of cooperation 
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III. THE NEW UNITED STATES 
A. THE MISSION DEFINES THE COALITION 
We are witnesses to a time period that includes fundamental changes in the 
environment of the Atlantic system. Two specific occurrences have modified the 
international security landscape decisively: first, the end of the Cold War period and, 
second, the new threat of international terrorism. 
The French scholar Francois Heisbourg summarizes the four main changes. First, 
the United States is the sole superpower and will not accept competitors. Second, “the 
mission makes the coalition,” which means that multilateral alliances no longer have the 
priority they had during the Cold War. Third, the acquisition of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) by states of concern has now been compounded by the threat of 
proliferation in the hands of non-state terrorist groups. This is why the United States had 
to legitimize its strategies of prevention and preemption to support and justify its actions. 
Fourth, Europe’s role has changed from that of an equal security partner to that of an area 
of major strategic concern, especially because of its collective refusal to rearm.75 This 
chapter will examine the impact of 9/11 in terms of its influence on United States foreign 
policy and the divergent historical perspectives between the United States and Europe. 
By comparing the National Security Strategy of the United States and the European 
Security Strategy, I will analyze common interests and dividing lines between the two 
powers. A subsequent comparison of the “Weinberger Doctrine” (1984) and the 
“Rumsfeld Doctrine” (2001) will show that the doctrines stand in marked contrast. 
“Embracing common liberal democratic norms and operating within interlocking 
multilateral institutions, the United States, western Europe, and later, Japan built an 
enduring postwar order.”76 I will argue that the transformation inspired by the United 
States adoption of the so-called “Rumsfeld Doctrine” broke with tradition and can be 
seen as one of the key aspects for the deterioration of the transatlantic relations. 
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Furthermore, Chapter III is an attempt to determine what implications these 
historical differences will have on the future development of the Atlantic system. This 
chapter will argue that there is now less reason than ever to cherish hopes for the future 
of the Atlantic Alliance. 
 
B. THE IMPACT OF 9/11 ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND 
ITS EFFECTS IN EUROPE 
For the United States, the end of the 20th century was also the end of the age of 
geopolitics. The age of world politics has inevitably begun.77 During the Cold War, the 
American security strategy aimed at preventing the Soviet Union from dominating the 
European continent. This was ultimately achieved through the breakdown and collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Since that time, the United States has altered its view of itself and of 
the world. The serious attack on the American mainland united the American population 
like no other incident since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941). The latter 
incident led, as is well known, to the active United States involvement in WWII. 
In the United States, foreign and security policies are developed jointly between 
the President and Congress, between the central government in Washington and the 
states, between political an economical interests, between protectionists and free traders, 
and so on. Mead differentiates between four main streams in current United States 
foreign policy,78 beginning with the “Hamiltonian,” named for Alexander Hamilton 
(1755-1804), who was minister of financial affairs under George Washington. 
Hamiltonians strove to form a close relationship between government and large-scale 
industry, to integrate the aspiring industrial and bank powers, to conduct political 
stability, and to achieve economical prosperity. The “Wilsonian,” outlook was named 
after President Wilson (1856-1924), who was in office from 1913 to 1921, during WWI. 
Wilsonians see America as having a moral obligation to promote the ideas and values of 
the American democracy in the world and to enforce the mastery of right in the 
international system. Wilson said: “The world will not be safe unless it’s democratic.” In 
 
77 Heinrich Kreft, “Weltpolitik statt Geopolitik: Die amerikanische Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik im 
Zeichen des Grauen Krieges,” in: Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003, ed. Erich Reiter. 
(Hamburg: Mittler Verlag, 2003), 441. 
29 
                                                
direct contrast to Wilsonian reasoning is the “Jeffersonian,” named for Thomas Jefferson 
(1742-1826), who was in office from 1801 to 1809. Jeffersonians want to reduce 
American foreign involvement to a minimum and see the security of democracy in the 
United States as their main interest. The “Jacksonian” perspective, named after the 
seventh president of the United States, Andrew Jackson (1767-1845), who was in office 
from 1829 to 1837, saw his main task as the physical security and economical welfare of 
its citizens. “Jacksonians” do not want to be involved in disputes with foreign powers, 
except when the United States is attacked, at which time they postulate a decisive 
engagement employing the whole of United States strength. These political currents do 
not follow directly from one another; rather, they stand beside each other and have had 
the same relevance from Americas foundation to the present. Because they are considered 
universal, they can be seen as an explanation of why a majority of Americans are 
convinced that the American social system is the best in the world and that the world 
would be better off if it would just act more like America. So it should not be surprising 
that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United States immediately took the offensive 
and tried to neutralize or to overwhelm the danger, instead of passively acquiescing. It is 
also not surprising that expansion is seen as the right path to security, a tenor which 
directly led the United States to wage a war against terrorism: a war the United States 
will fight until it is won. 
France and Germany also recognized that Iraq is a problem, but they did not 
support war as solution. Instead, the Europeans warned that an occupation of Iraq would 
provoke more terrorism and a destabilized Arab world.79 Now these governments find 
themselves in a dilemma: the more they reject the use of military power to solve specific 
international problems, the more they reinforce the conclusion that consultation and 
cooperation is a waste of time. This is why NATO, unfortunately, is no longer the 
primary forum for United States foreign and security policy. 
European history is a history of revolution and war. These wars were fought on 
European soil, and the collective memories of the last devastating war are still very vivid 
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and influential. Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, Europe’s former enemy, 
Russia, has become an important trading partner. The largest European countries account 
for over a half of Russia’s foreign trade and the bulk of its foreign debt. Germany is the 
main consumer of Russia’s energy resources. Russia had reasons to support France and 
Germany in their approach to oppose the Iraq war, but France and Germany, who 
welcomed Russia’s decision with relief, had other reasons for their anti-American 
attitude. It was their chance to save face in a losing game. The irreconcilable attitude on 
the issue of military escalation around Iraq threatened France and Germany with a 
political vacuum.80 Belgium was the only country in Europe to dare support them. It was 
clear that most of the EU and, especially, the East European countries would support the 
United States line. The question remains, however: what was the underlying reason 
France and Germany opted for a pacifist attitude? Under the influence of an external 
threat, NATO’s members had been mostly successful in maintaining a common strategy 
within Europe. Without such a common threat they have often disagreed on the best 
course of action, especially in regard to the rest of the world.81 
Again, as so often in the history of NATO, the tune was clearly set by Paris, 
which has pursued an independent international policy ever since Charles de Gaulle 
instituted it nearly sixty years ago.82 The population of France (many of whom are 
Moslems) feared that the Iraq war would provoke a new stage of terrorism and violence, 
the destructive consequences of which, citizens of the French fifth Republic had 
experienced long before 9/11.83 In addition, France has economic interests in the Middle 
East. In the past few decades, the fifth Republic has been trying not to endanger its 
relations with the Arab world. 
Germany also had its own reasons. The widespread rumor that Chancellor 
Schröder is fighting for peace because the majority of Germans are against the war is 
hardly justified.84 Germany’s population is more concerned about their own economic 
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problems than about Saddam Hussein’s future. Those pacifist ideations did not appear to 
help Social Democrats and Greens during Germany’s recent local elections (the last one 
in Schleswig-Holstein), in which the ruling coalition lost.85 Schröder campaigned against 
the United States and a possible Iraq war, and George W. Bush’s unwillingness to forgive 
the chancellor’s actions drove the German government into the arms of the French, who 
have supported Chirac to maintain his antiwar decision.86 
Since World War II, Germany has hardly ever expressed foreign policy 
ambitions, although this does not mean that it has none. As a divided nation during the 
Cold War at the front line of confrontations, Germany did not have the possibility, and 
later did not have a chance, to realize those ambitions. Germany’s current involvement in 
the “anti-war alliance” can be seen as an attempt to position itself as an independent 
player on the world scene. It seems like the politics of the nineteenth  century are coming 
back. Fortunately, the main difference between the nineteenth and first half of the 
twentieth century and the present is that Germany is now integrated into a network of 
alliances, a common market, and bilateral/multilateral treaties. 
The United States as Hegemon – What are the interests of the United States in 
maintaining its membership in these alliances? Alliances are a catalyst for the United 
States to exercise its superior influence in collective organizations. In addition, they 
permit burden-sharing by maintenance of trade relations and, prevent the emergence of 
another superpower. The initial draft of the Pentagon`s Defense Planning Guidance 
states: ”we must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to 
discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established 
political or economic order” and “we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring 
potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”87 On the 
other hand, alliances permit weaker states to restrict the action of stronger states. In sum, 
the German-Franco response is not anti-Americanism in the sense of hostility, but a 
refusal to accept United States leadership simply because it is the sole superpower. As 
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my analysis of the European Security Strategy will show, Europe wants to establish its 
own right to act as a key player in world politics. Europe does not want to accept 
decisions pertaining to global peace or war if they are decided unilaterally in Washington. 
Taking into consideration these diverse interests, it is necessary to compare the basic 
security strategies of the United States and Europe to identify common interests. 
 
C. A COMPARISON OF THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF 
AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY 
The aim of this section is to compare the U.S. National Security Strategy 
(September 2002) and the European Security Strategy (8 December 2003). The United 
States of America is a nation at war against terrorism, and it is obvious that the incidents 
of 9/11 had a significant influence on its National Security Strategy (NSS). Furthermore, 
it may also be obvious to the reader that the basic differences between the NSS and the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) are the result of the two entities, divergent perceptions 
of the world. The NSS tends toward a realist view, while the ESS tends to reflect a more 
liberal view of the world. Although their individual threat perceptions are quite similar 
and their priorities are clear, the language of the two strategies is quite different. The NSS 
is generally more specific, its language reflects a determination to act. The ESS language 
tends to be more descriptive, but is sometimes vague or even ambiguous. While the tone 
of the NSS is more aggressive and prioritizes military action, the ESS favors diplomacy, 
political negotiation, and economic action, with military action being understood as a 
means of last resort. That is why Robert Kagan compressed the two approaches into the 
simple thesis that the Americans are tough Hobbesians and Europeans timid Kantian 
appeasers. “Americans are from Mars; Europeans are from Venus.”88 Consequentially, he 
argued that it is time “to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common 
view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.”89 Kagan’s explanation of 
the transatlantic situation, however, has proven to be inappropriate, as ongoing 
difficulties in overcoming post-war Iraq’s problems prove that, even in a globalized 
world, the United States needs Europe and vise versa. The EU High Representative for 
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the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Janvier Solana, put it simply: “Getting 
others to want what you want can be much more efficient in getting others to do what you 
want”  and, in the process, proposed a marriage between Mars and Venus that could lead 
to the birth, as in the original myth, of the beautiful goddess Harmonia.90 
Another basic difference between the two strategies concerns the NSS global 
approach as compared to the ESS regional approach. Both strategies, however, emphasize 
the need to work together, as no single country possesses the ability to solve all of the 
world’s problems. The NSS can be read as a warning to all weak, non-cooperating and 
competing states to cooperate with the United States. The NSS is the initial Security 
Strategy that was completed with a framework of sub strategies, like homeland security, 
weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, cyberspace, critical infrastructure, 
protection, and drug control.91 
In the next section I compare the NSS with the ESS along the lines of several 
categories, including threat perception, strategic objectives, international cooperation, 
(multilateralism, as well as unilateralism and the role of the United Nations), policy 
implications for Europe, and capabilities. 
 
1. Threat Perception 
As already mentioned, the United States and European security strategies share a 
number of similar views on the threats we all face. Both strategies describe the same 
basic challenges and threats for human beings in the twenty-first century. The ESS 
perceived threats explicitly in terms of “global challenges and key threats.”92 The 
wording seems to imply that Europe had always intended to act against “global 
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challenges” like poverty and disease, AIDS, water scarcity, global warming, and 
migratory movements with economic measures.93 
Like the NSS, the ESS defines “terrorism” as an imminent global threat and 
stresses that terrorists “seek to undermine the openness and tolerance of Western 
societies.”94 Both the NSS and ESS use an active approach in the fight against terrorism. 
The ESS stresses that “concerted European action is indispensable,”95 but Europe is 
much less inclined to restrict individual rights in favor of preventive security measures. 
This can be explained by the slight cultural differences between the United States and 
Europe. As opposed to Europe, “the United States of America is fighting a war against 
terrorists of global reach.”96 In terms of preemption, this means attacking terrorists 
worldwide and combating the growth of Islamic terrorism. There is no information in the 
ESS pertaining to transatlantic cooperation in the fight against terrorism. 
The primary threat to the United States, according to the NSS, is acts of terrorism 
committed by transnational actors with global reach, supported by rouge states, and using 
WMD. In the ESS, WMD are identified as “potentially the greatest threat to the peace 
and security.”97 In comparison with the NSS, this formulation seems vague. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the United States has developed a sub strategy that 
describes the three “pillars” of United States anti-WMD policy: “counterproliferation to 
combat WMD use”; “strengthened non-proliferation to combat WMD proliferation”; and 
“consequence management to respond to WMD use.”98 
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The NSS is more specific in its definitions of regions and their threats. Its 
approach is more global than that of the ESS, which conveys a more Eurocentric focus. 
The ESS mentions conflicts, like those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region, the Korean 
Peninsula, and the Middle East, as having a direct or indirect impact on European 
interests. In addition, the ESS mentions that the “most practical way to tackle the often 
elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional 
conflict.” Through the use of subtle hints, the ESS comments on the colonial heritage of 
many European countries, some of which still have colonial responsibilities that may be 
beneficial in resolving questions of regional security. Many of the addressed problems 
cannot be solved through military means, as their causes are often historically 
conditioned and deeply anchored. 
Proposals for cooperation with African countries are outlined in great detail in the 
ESS, due to the colonial background of many European countries. The NSS appears 
biased in its support for Israel, identifying the Palestinians as the main aggressors in the 
Middle East and calling for them to “embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront 
corruption, and firmly reject terror.”99 The ESS agrees that the Arab/Israeli conflict is the 
main problem in the Middle East, but takes no unequivocal stand.100 In both strategies, 
state failure and weak states are described as the reason for regional instability and a 
source of terrorism and organized crime. Drafted after 9/11, the NSS shows the 
willingness of the United States to act against these global threats.101 Because “Europe is 
a prime target for organized crime,” these topics claim increased emphasis.102 Conflict 
prevention cannot start early enough, but, first and foremost, must begin with economical 
means. 
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The NSS outlines a basic global approach, while the basic approach contained in 
the ESS is limited to special regions of interest; however, the ESS pays more attention to 
“soft skills” outside the security-threat terms of reference. 
 
2. Strategic Objectives 
The ESS defines specific purposes for its strategic objectives. In the ESS, 
Europe’s responsibility for global security is vaguely formulated, but the strategy implies 
“that the first line of defense will often be abroad.”103 
The NSS espouses the right to act unilaterally, “before” an enemy is fully formed. 
Both strategies provide for a strategy of early intervention, but the ESS doesn’t describe 
the reason for or the type of intervention as clearly as the NSS. In addition, both 
strategies include an admission that no single country is able “to build a safer, better 
world alone,”104 or, as the ESS expresses it, “No single country is able to tackle today’s 
complex problems on its own.”105 
The NSS argues that those nations that are dependent on the United States 
ensuring international stability have the duty to cooperate with the United States to 
achieve that goal. The ESS, on the other hand, stresses that nations have to deal 
peacefully through common and international institutions.   
The ESS offers a detailed description as to how international cooperation should 
work and how it should not work. One of Europe’s objectives is to develop a stronger 
international society, a society that would stand in direct opposition to the interests 
outlined in the NSS, by limiting potential United States courses of action. The ESS 
stresses that “regional conflicts need political solutions, but recognizes that military 
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assets and effective policing may be needed in the post-conflict phase,”106 missions for 
which the EU is well equipped and prepared. 
The NSS consciously describes the necessity of coalitions of the willing; 
however, the last so-called coalition of the willing only served to split European nations 
over the issue of participation in the Iraq war. 
 
3. International Cooperation 
The ESS is unequivocal in its commitment to the United Nations charter. The 
European priority is to strengthen this institution and support it with all necessary means 
at its disposal. The aim is “an international order based on effective multilateralism.”107 
The NSS also states that the United States is committed to the United Nations, NATO, 
and other long lasting alliances, but “coalitions of the willing can augment these 
permanent institutions.”108 In contradiction, the ESS stresses that the European nations 
must rely first on European and international institutions. The NSS recognizes the 
military legitimacy of NATO and its status as the strongest and most capable institution 
in the world, while simultaneously minimizing the EU’s role as an economic 
institution.109  
With respect to acceptance of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the NSS 
explicitly point out: “whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do 
not accept.” Institutions like the ICC, which, in Europe, are recognized as trust-builders, 
are, from the United States perspective, seen as limiting. While both the NSS and the ESS 
acknowledge the need for international institutions, the United States retains the right of 
unilateral intervention when deemed necessary. The United States is also reluctant to join 
the ICC or the Kyoto Treaty due to fears that such participation would limit its scope of 
possible future action. 
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The NSS stresses that the United States needs support from its allies and friends 
with  regard  to  intelligence, law enforcement, and the disruption of terrorist fighting, but  
European nations resent the notion of their being used as a “toolbox.” The U.S seems 
skeptical of EU defense efforts. In the NSS, NATO is recognized as the most capable 
European defense organization. 
However, the aim addressed in the ESS is to be in “an effective and balanced 
partnership with the United States.” The ESS can be seen as confession for the 
continuation of good transatlantic relations.110 
The ESS states that “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, 
rapid, and when necessary robust intervention,”111 but it remains unclear what 
“intervention” means in this context. Does it mean military intervention like operation 
ARTEMIS in Congo, or deployments such as fact-finding missions, civil military 
observers, development aid, or other confidence-building measures?112 The ESS fails to 
adequately outline circumstances that might warrant intervention. 
 
4. Policy Implications 
The ESS expresses a better model than the NSS for transatlantic coordination. 
Europe needs “to work with others,” but, outside the European engagement in NATO, the 
ESS addresses the need “to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when 
necessary, robust intervention.”113 
Both security strategies include consideration of preemptive action; however, in 
the ESS, the word is not “preemptive”, but rather “preventive.” The NSS stresses that 
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“the United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats,”114 but the 
United States does not hesitate to act unilaterally. 
The ESS specifically addresses the question of efficient foreign policy to support 
proper coordination of military, economic, and political means to get the most efficient 
results and to avoid duplications. The ESS places primacy in achieving political solutions 
to international problems, augmented as necessary by military action and effective 
policing in the post-conflict phase. Therefore, Europe has to become more closely 
engaged with troubled countries. The NSS desclares that the United States will not 
provide assistance to those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. 
 
5. Capabilities 
Over the last few years, the capability debate115 has focused on the significant gap 
between Europe and the United States in terms of military expenditures. While the NSS 
describes a necessity to transform all major institutions of national security, the ESS 
stresses that “to transform our military into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable 
them to address the new threats, more resources for defense and more effective use of 
resources is necessary.”116 The ESS rightly points this out and argues that the systematic 
use of pooled and shared assets would increase capabilities. Nevertheless, pooling 
defense assets is still a crucial point in the EU, because it is directly connected to the 
sovereignty of the member states. 
It is, however, crucial to remember, that “a more capable Europe” is not only an 
issue of military capabilities. Europe’s prevention and post-war peace-building 
capabilities are also equally important. After each military intervention civilian 
reconstruction is necessary. The EU needs “a stronger diplomacy to combine the 
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resources of the member states with those of EU-institutions.”117 In today’s situation, it is 
not realistic to expect that economically hard-pressed governments in Europe will 
drastically increase defense spending. The more necessary it is to press ahead with “the 
systematic use of pooled and shared assets,” the more emphasis that must be placed on 
the output of money that is available. 
Both strategies express a will to improve and to share intelligence with member 
states and partners. In respect to improved and shared intelligence, the ESS stresses that a 
“common threat assessment is the necessary basis for common actions.”118 Member 
states and partners are asked to participate. The argument is convincing, but the language 
of the ESS remains vague. The ESS indicates that the EU continues to be reliant on 
NATO for true defense. In the meantime, the EU-NATO permanent arrangements bridge 
the EU reliance on NATO.119 To amend this problem, the EU must be more committed to 
fill up its capability shortfalls. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The ESS is the European answer to the NSS; both strategies deal with many of the 
same issues. The structure of the ESS reflects a more general approach to those issues, 
while the NSS offers a more detailed plan of action, especially in terms of threat 
perception. That is why the ESS is regarded by the nations of the European Union as a 
much more serious document than its predecessors. But because of its vague language, it 
represents more a broad statement than a set of binding commitments. The EU may be a 
global player because of its economical strength, but it is not a global actor. 
The ESS advances the idea of “civilian power” instead of “superpower,” with the 
view that European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) facilitates the EU acting “as a 
real civilian power in the world, that is to say as a force for the external promotion of 
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democratic principles.”120 This is what Robert Kagan attempted to argue  that the 
Europeans and the United States are, in effect, occupying different planets in regard to 
issues such as efficacy, morality, and the desirability of power.121 What is irritating for 
Kagan and his contemporaries is that the ESS expresses the determination of the 
European nations not to act, but to react, and to only use military means as a last resort. 
In both strategies, however, allowance is made for preemptive/preventive military action 
in extraordinary cases. 
The United States feels it has an obligation to assume a leadership role in 
international relations. Because of its unique historical position as the world’s sole 
remaining superpower, this uncontested U.S. hegemony, is a welcome opportunity to 
shape the international microstrucure. 
Neither the NSS nor the ESS excludes preemptive/preventive military action, but, 
at its core, the NSS calls for the United States to use its “unparalleled military strength 
and great economic and political influence” to establish a “balance of power that favors 
human freedom.”122 For the United States government the threat lies in a combination of 
terror, tyranny, and weapons of mass-destruction. Thus the NSS stresses that the 
combination of those three factors makes the security situation in the world more 
complex and dangerous. 
Furthermore, the NSS focus is on states as key actors. This is one of the main 
differences between the NSS and the ESS. The NSS argues that international stability 
comes primarily from democratic states interacting peacefully with others, rather than 
through individual norms anchored in international institutions and law. This approach 
stands in marked contrast to the ESS. 
The NSS is based on a dedicated faith in democracy  a faith based, in turn, on 
American history and culture that their leaders will recognize the correct path and 
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embrace the opportunity for leadership. As a product of the Bush administration, the NSS 
lays out an approach that differs significantly from earlier strategies.123 
Both the NSS and the ESS begin with a threat assessment much different than 
those of the past. But they are similar in describing the threats and in recognizing current 
events, not as a clash of civilizations or a confrontation between powers that struggle to 
dominate world politics, but as a struggle between civilized states and uncivilized states, 
dominated politics, and chaos. The NSS paints the United States as a vulnerable society 
living under the scourge of an “imminent threat.” As such, it is obvious that this national 
strategy was written and ratified shortly after the incidents of 9/11. 
The National Security Strategy of the United States and transformation of the 
United States forces stand in tight coherence. In the next section, therefore I explore the 
central question: What are the main differences between the “Weinberger Doctrine” and 
the newly adopted “Rumsfeld Doctrine” and how was this paradigm shift possible? 
 
D. A PARADIGM SHIFT  FROM THE “WEINBERGER DOCTRINE” TO 
TRANSFORMATION 
Caspar Weinberger was the secretary of defense under the Reagan presidency 
(1981-89). Together with Colin Powell as his assistant, he developed the so-called 
“Weinberger doctrine,” based on lessons learned from the Vietnam war. Colin Powell 
was a Vietnam veteran and his influence on the Weinberger doctrine is obvious. As this 
section demonstrates, the “Weinberger doctrine” was largely influenced by Clausewitzian 
theories. But the enormous military and economical power of the United States, 
combined with the new sense of vulnerability after September 11, constrained United 
States policy makers and inspired them to act different. The idea of a sweeping and 
dramatic military transformation, the so-called “Rumsfeld Doctrine,” does anymore 
respect the principles of the “Weinberger Doctrine.” (This discussion may be especially 
interesting to those who believe that the primacy of politics is the supposition most 
essential to wining the war against terrorism without damaging democracy. I relate those 
ideas to examples from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.) 
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The “Weinberger Doctrine” argued that engagement in war is necessary if the 
vital interests of the United States or its allies are at stake. The Weinberger approach was 
defensive, active only when necessary, and war was seen as a means of last resort. The 
current United States doctrine, the so-called “Rumsfeld Doctrine,” has a much more 
active approach. Preemptive and preventive military actions are seen as necessary to 
dissuade adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, on 
developing a particular key military advantage.124 “Do everything you need to do first, 
taking as much time as you need. Then you can be certain of one thing: ultimate triumph. 
No matter how different the war proves to be.”125 To achieve this goal the Department of 
Defense of the United States (DOD) tried to combine the military with other instruments 
of national power in a process called “interagency process.”126 
But what exactly does transformation mean here? “Transformation is a process 
that saves the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new 
combinations, concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s 
advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic 
position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”127 Transformation is a 
modification of war. War is no longer the continuation of policy by other means, but by 
all means, including economical and information technology. 
This doctrine was the basis for and the driving force behind the unilateral actions 
of the United States against Afghanistan and Iraq, where, because of the U.S. military 
superiority, there was no need for allies. This procedure has been be conceived by some 
as “aggressive multilateralism,”128 because so-called “partner” countries had no real 
choice. They had, and have to support the war against terrorism; otherwise they are 
supporters of terrorism according to President George W. Bush, who argues, that 
 
124 Department of Defense, “The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” March 
2005. 
125 The basic tenets of this strategy are: High technology combat systems, reliance on the Air Force, 
small, nimble ground forces. The new America Foundation, “The Rumsfeld doctrine,” 
http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=613 (accessed March 16, 2005). 
126 Scott W. Moore, “Today it’s Gold, Not Purple” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 20 (Autumn/Winter 
1998/1999) 100-105, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jq_pubs/1820.pdf (April 16, 2005). 
127 Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003 (accessed December 16, 2004). 
128 Politikwissen.de, “Where do we go from here,” 
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whoever is not with us, is against us. In the war against terrorism there can be no 
neutrality. But under President George Bush diplomacy worked differently. The first Gulf 
war enjoyed the benefit of great international consent and the legitimization of the United 
Nations. The legitimization from the U.S. Congress was the supposition to go to war. The 
primacy of policy was saved. In the case of the third Gulf War, George W. Bush acted 
reciprocally. With the support of the U.S. Congress, he was able to use the U.S. forces, 
without even the consent of the United Nations “to guard the national security against the 
constant threat of Iraq.”129 This decision, however, lacked international support. 
The Weinberger Doctrine points out that, if you decide to be militarily engaged, 
use all military means necessary to win the war. Clausewitz would argue in this case “that 
war is nothing other than the continuation of policy with other means.”130 And if war is 
the continuation of policy, “there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a 
great strategic issue nor a purely military scheme to solve it.”131 
The current United States concept of military transformation, based on Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s modification of the Clausewitzian theory that “war is the continuation of 
policy with other means,” is dangerous. If war in the twenty-first century is fought with 
no “other” means than “all” means, then policy is subordinated to the desire to prevail. 
Today’s U.S. policy developments are aimed at the continuation of the war against 
terrorism. But who controls this process and what is the standard of victory or defeat? It 
seems the primacy of policy is not respected. 
Furthermore, the Weinberger Doctrine argues that political and military objectives 
must be clearly defined. “Clausewitz stressed planning a campaign clearly through to 
completion in order to achieve political objectivenessincluding creating military 
conditions that would facilitate negotiations.”132 He also cautioned against “overshooting  
 
129 Joint Resolution 46 of the U.S. Congress to authorize the use of United States Forces against Iraq, 
October 2, 2002. 
130 Carl von Clausewitz, “Note of July 1827”, On War, 69. Emphasis in original, in: Peter, Paret, ed. 
The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelly to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: University Press, 1986), 
197. 
131 Ibid, 200. 
132 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton: University Press, 1976), 579. 
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the target” in military operations. In Iraq, combat planning was in the foreground while 
the endstate deliberations planning for the situation after the war, became merely part of 
the background. 
The assumption that, after a victory over the Saddam Hussein regime, the 
establishment of democracy and peace would occur automatically was wrong. Liberty 
and order are conditions that need cooperative measures. They cannot be achieved 
violently. The inclusion of potential post-war situations in deliberations during the 
planning phase of a war is absolutely essential. 
Like Clausewitz, the Weinberger doctrine argues that political and military 
objectives must be continually reassessed. Therefore, “each regional commander in chief 
(CINC) should have a standing interagency team to act as an operations transition 
planning cell. This element must include members well versed in the application of the 
military, diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.”133 
Many have long argued, even before the war, that the U.S. administrations plans for 
rebuilding Iraq were inadequate and were based on overly optimistic assumptions that 
Americans would be greeted as liberators. Now, at worst, the conditions in Iraq could 
change to a civil war. How could this misjudgment happen? 
As the Weinberger Doctrine advises only incur liabilities if you have the support 
of your own population. Clausewitz would argue that the unity of politics, the military, 
and the population (trinity) is a necessary precondition to going to war. The political 
leadership must not only have a goal that the army will try to achieve, but also the 
population has to support the war. 
The Weinberger Doctrine describes war as the last means. While Clausewitz also 
describes war as the last means of politics, the war in Afghanistan and in Iraq in terms of 
the warlords changed to a war in principle. The “Rumsfeld Doctrine” includes explicit 
preventive warfare as is expressed in the motto: “do everything you need to do first, 
taking as much time as you need.”134 In the U.S. war against terrorism, the war has been 
 
133 John R. Boule, JFQ Autumn/Winter, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1929.pdf (accessed 
March 16, 2005). 
134 Scott W. Moore, “Today it’s Gold, Not Purple” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 20 (Autumn/Winter 
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promoted as a panacea of policy. The lack of diplomacy and negotiations, the lack of a 
stable Western great alliance able to coordinate economic and development aid, are the 
reason why the strategy in Iraq has not been successful. Because it can rely on its military 
technological superiority, the United States obviously prefers to achieve a successful 
outcome in conflicts prevailing with violent means. In contrast the militarily weakly 
armed European states see themselves as mainly civil powers and are unready to risk war, 
rather than other means. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
In the preceding discussions I suggest that there were specific circumstances 
leading to a deep crisis in the transatlantic relations. It is revealing how small the 
commonalties seem when important, not merely rhetorical, decisions have to be made. In 
determining when and under what circumstances to go to war issue the United States and 
Europe take irreconcilable positions. But Europe itself also divided on this issue. The 
European Security Strategy attempts to verbalize a common accepted position. That is 
why its language is vague in regard critical questions. 
However, it is hard to believe that the Weinberger Doctrine has been made 
obsolete by the Rumsfeld Doctrine. The principles of Clausewitz and the Weinberger 
doctrine are still valid. American self-confidence in dealing with power is not new, but 
the United States definition of the international order is. The painfully experienced 
vulnerability of United States on September 11 and the new capabilities to be acquired to 
the military transformation left its stamp on today’s U.S. foreign policy. The war against 
terrorism is fought without compromise. A peaceful coexistence with terrorists is 
impossible. Therefore, the United States is looking for allies with the same “with-us-or-
against-us-ideology.” This strategy splits the Western world and weakens the world’s 
most successful alliance and its fight against terrorism. Europe does not want to accept 
that decisions about global peace or war are decided unilaterally in Washington, 
especially when those decisions are presented through a neoconservative Bush 
government as part of the doctrine of military preemption. As Paul Berman argues the 
postwar order should be based on “Embracing common liberal democratic norms and 
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operating within interlocking multilateral institutions.”135 Transformation breaks with 
that tradition and can be seen as one of the key factors in the deterioration of the 
transatlantic relations. 
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IV. THE NEW EURPEAN UNION 
A. THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 
European economical cooperation after WWII started with the Montan union. It 
was founded on April 18th, 1951, by France, Italy, the Benelux countries, and the Federal 
Republic of Germany.136 The Montan union can be seen as the germ cell of the European 
Union (EU). Since the EU`s foundation in 1957, Germany and France have been the core 
nations.137 In January 2003, German chancellor Gerhard Schröder met in Paris with 
French president Jacques Chirac to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Franco-
German Elysèe Treaty (1963), which has a strict bilateral character.138 There can be no 
doubt that each state is an important partner to the other, which is exactly what both 
states have affirmed over the course of the years. They have proved to be the main engine 
of enlargement in the European Union. In the light of the new global threats, cooperation 
between the two countries is now of special importance to the Union, especially in the 
field of security policies. France, in reasserting “its desire to strengthen its relationship 
with Germany, had suggested to raising its military collaboration with its eastern 
neighbor to a European level.”139 The question remains, however, do both states actually 
act cooperatively, with one voice? 
In the specific case concerning decisions about the third Iraq war, their intra state 
cooperative action was a reality. In terms of European policies, both states suggested a 
European security and defense union with a majority principle, with responsibility for 
assistance and common planning. This decision was facilitated by the favorable relations  
 
136 Deutscher Bundestag, Fragen an die Deutsche Geschichte: Ideen, Kräfte, Entscheidungen von 
1800 bis zur Gegenwart (Bonn: Bundesdruckerei, 1993), 376. 
137 The head of governments of the Montan union signed the 1957 treaty of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Deutscher Bundestag, 
380. 
138 Ludolf Herbst, Option für den Westen: Vom Mashallplan bis zum deutsch-französischen Vertrag, 
(München: DTV, 1989), 203. 
139 Jean-Yves Haine, ESDP: An overview (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 1. 
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between the two ruling governments, which have never been as good as they seem to be 
today. Before 1998, these relationships seemed disturbed, and the European “motor” 
more likely to stutter and stall.140 
Despite the most recent swell in European cooperation, questions remain 
concerning Europe’s enduring interest in achieving a common security and defense 
policy and their ability to maintain these mutual interests over time. We must also 
consider the possibility that France sees the European Union as a means to an end: a 
simple tool to be manipulated in an attempt to achieve national aims they would be 
unable to realize on their own due to their relative weakness in relation to their European 
neighbors. France has long perceived itself as a counterweight to the United States in 
Europe, as the French minister for foreign affairs Hubert Védrine stressed in 1998: “we 
cannot accept a unipolar political world and therefore we will fight for a multipolar 
world.”141 
Is European policy a detour for countries` other aims or a real mutual project and 
a permanent interest? For Germany, the decisive issue will be how France, its closest 
partner in the European security policy environment, will approach and handle European 
security. In addition how the European Union addresses the question of war or peace will 
not only influence security throughout Europe, but also in the greater world. According to 
this argument, France will attempt to influence, and infuse its own national interests into, 
the European Union’s security and defense policies.142 
 
B. GERMAN INTERESTS 
The Federal Republic of Germany’s core politic are as follows: First, the welfare 
of the population; second, liberty, democracy, and human rights; and third, security.143 
Since Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963), the basis of federal German foreign policy has 
 
140 Jean-Marc Trouille, “The Franco-German Axis since Unification,” in France from the Cold War to 
the New World Order, ed. Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), 58. 
141 Matthias Rüb. Der Atlantische Graben: Amerika und Europa auf getrennten Wegen (Wien: Paul 
Zsolnay Verlag, 2004), 49. 
142 Janet Bryant, “Changing Circumstances, Changing Policies? The 1994 Defense White Paper and 
Beyond,” in France from the Cold War to the New World Order, ed. Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins (New 
York: St. Martins Press, 1996), 91. 
143 Axel Lüdeke, Europäisierung der deutschen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Opladen 2002, 126. 
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been and continues to be the desire for close connections with the United States, to 
reconcile historical disputes with France, and to increase European integration.144 These 
interests must be examined in conjunction with the influence of decisive historical 
experiences which have influenced the German political system. After World War II, the 
foreign policy of the German Federal Republic was greatly restricted due to the burden of 
National Socialist crimes, the limited sovereignty imposed by the occupation forces after 
the war, the nations division into two states, and the Republic’s integration into 
supranational organizations.145 Neutralism was seen as a revival of the German 
Sonderweg and hence declined.146 
Under these restrictions, only one German foreign and security policy could be 
adopted with a hope of success: permanent self-restraint, combined with the 
abandonment of sovereignty. In simple terms, the Federal Republic adopted a policy of 
multilateralism in order to forward its interests and reach its aims. By means of 
multipolar integration and cooperation on the international stage, it was able to regain 
international trust despite occurrences before 1945. The basic German law prescribes a 
policy of candid and cooperative internationalism in to further particular European 
integration. Even after Germany’s reunification, these aims have not changed.147 
Germany does not want to be a dominant power in Europe; instead, it favors a policy of 
self-restraint and multilateral power. Germany wants to be “a major power but not a great 
one.”148 
 
1. Security Policy 
Kirchner argues that after WWII “the Federal Republic of Germany acquired a 
phobic against the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy, sought its identity 
 
144 Jeffrey Herf. War byOther Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battles of the 
Euromissiles (New York: Free Press, 1991), 15. 
145 Gregor Schöllgen, “Deutschland an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert: Gibt es noch eine deutsche 
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215. 
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within European and Atlantic multilateral structures, and until unification found the term 
‘national interest’ disquieting.”149 
Even today, Germany follows a strict security policy of integration,150 aiming to 
link state power and military power into a network of mutually supportive organizations. 
Security is achieved through far-reaching, decentralized powers and the leverage of 
power against influence on other participants, by means of bilateral contracts (e.g., with 
France), and multilateral coalitions (e.g., EU, OSZE, VN) and confederations (e.g., 
NATO). Because of Germany’s geographic position in central Europe, the unique 
historical experience, the threats of the international system, the constraints of 
constitutional law, and established institutions like the EU and NATO, as well as 
German-French cooperation, the federal Republic will continue to be a member of 
multilateral organizations. ESDP goes even further  Germany is deeply interested in, and 
pushing for, a more Europeanized security policy. The German EU presidency helped to 
change the European defense identity into a European security and defense policy.151 
 
2. European Policy 
German European policy was designed to pursue core German interests while 
Germany integrated itself as a peaceful partner with the Western nations 
(westintegration), and to reach reconciliation with France in order to contain it within the 
overriding European order. As already mentioned, an indispensable module at the 
bilateral level is the Elysée Treaty with France of January 22, 1963.152 Multilaterally, 
European integration is most important for Germany, as this kind of integration not only 
important has European aims but also is especially conducive to Germany’s economical 
and national self-interest. As its long-term goal, therefore, Germany is interested in the 
maintenance of, deeper integration with, and multinational cooperation within the 
European framework, like all the other member states, because of the inherent political 
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and economical interdependencies.153 This also includes the so-called “enlargement” 
interest in the involvement of East European states.154 
Success will be possible if, and only if, Germany is able to avoid countervailing 
power multilaterally and bilaterally to fulfill its constitutional guidelines and to influence 
the outcome of European policy. This would be not possible as a separatist.  
 
C. FRENCH INTERESTS 
French foreign policy reflects core interests similar to those of Germany. 
However, France does not operate on the basis of “Realpolitik,” but on a political-cultural 
basis of the “Gaullism” of the fifth French Republic. As Phillip Gordon expresses it, “The 
Gaullist years may not represent an entirely new era in the history of France, but in a 
number of ways, they set a standard of continuity and change.”155 This argument is based 
on three pillars. First, “Grandeur”156 which derives from France’s historical and cultural 
global size and its rank in the international system. Second, “Indepéndence,”157 derived 
from France’s national independence and autonomy and sovereign French decisions; and 
third, “État nation,”158 meaning nation-state acting as a protagonist in the international 
system. Gordon gets to the heart of French policy when he stresses that “the belief in 
France’s universal mission often appeared to others as just the sort of hegemonic 
pretention of which the superpowers were accused by de Gaulle himself  de Gaulle’s 
Europe of states would fall under French hegemony in the same way an Atlantic Europe 
fell under American it also implied a hierarchization of nation-states, with France, 
naturally, at or near the top.”159 France wants Europe to have maximum autonomy from 
United States domination. This basic persuasion can be seen in the historical and cultural 
coinages of French policy, consisting of revolutionary values, societal crisises, lost wars, 
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a number of invasions, colonial experiences, former great-power status, permanent 
membership in the UN Security Council, and French nuclear weapons. These ideas are 
sustained, even in periods of “cohabitation” by all political encampments160 and are 
aimed at the enlargement of French influence, to reclaim their great-power status. 
 
1. Security Policy  
France follows a security policy based on its sovereignty, and the above 
mentioned French convictions determine foreign policy decisively. Security without 
influence through foreign powers is solely feasible by strict autonomy and delimitation 
from other actors. The sustaining pillars of the French security policy are accordingly 
nation-state-centric and are aimed at defending France from foreign influences, for 
example by the use of nuclear deterrence, the Force de Frappe (FdF) and by power 
projection (intervention, airplane carrier). Thus, France seeks multipolarity and the 
enforcement of the law of nations; unilateral action, as a basic principle, is disclaimed. 
Till the end of the cold war, France wanted to realize three main goals:161 the 
involvement of Germany in European tasks, the linking of the United States with Europe, 
and the containment of the Soviet influence. In relation to the basic conviction of 
“independence,” France established a demand for nuclear weapons and a special position 
in NATO, as well as an unavoidable European defense identity. French politicians try to 
maintain this even today. 
 
2. European Policy 
In de Gaulle’s European policy of the fifth French Republic, the following 
principles had priority: first, security with and against Germany; second, European 
policy, which was first and foremost a policy about Germany; and third, France’s need to 
protect itself against Germany. France was able to gain influence only with Germany 
 
160 “The French people are certainly not the only ones who believe they produce values which are 
applicable to all humanity: but they have implanted this universalism at the very heart of their national 
ideology. The French revolution, while defending the territory of the Republic, also meant to bring 
enlightenment to the world.” Dominique David, “The Search for a New Security Strategy in a Shifting 
International Arena,” in France from the Cold War to the New World Order, eds. Tony Chafer and Brian 
Jenkins. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), 66. 
161 Stephen Philip Kramer, 89. 
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toward other “poles.”162 In all, the German influence was not allowed to get overly 
strong because this would have endangered the French position. The Elysée treaty (1963) 
gives an impression of the fine-tuning of this relation.163  
Today the political situation is different, even though French interests have not 
changed. Germany has been reunified for more than fifteen years and has a strong 
economic and political potential. Today it is obvious that the interests of France’s 
security policy can be achieved most likely within Europe, with a consistent French 
European policy defining its interests in a more adaptive way, while still retaining its 
same traditional approach focused on functional interests:164 
- A union of European states has to be created, 
- with Germany and France at its core, 
- equally allied with United States, 
- with a targeted common global foreign policy, 
- with France in the leading role because of its global weight. 
These goals have been widely repeated and affirmed by relevant French political 
actors in recent years. Correspondingly, France sees itself as the kernel of a future west 
European great power. The vision of speaking with one Europeans voice means, 
nonetheless, not to weaken member states. Hardly ever the own state. 
 
D. FRENCH EUROPEAN POLICY SINCE 1945 
To understand European policy within the French political system, it is important 
to analyze the intertwining of domestic and foreign policy. Frances foreign policy refers 
to Germany, the former Soviet Union, and various former imperial holdings, as well as ist 
relationships with United States and NATO. In addition we must also consider the 
conditions of the constitution of the Fifth French Republic: the competencies of the 
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ministers (every three month), personnel exchanges between the each countries` armed forces, armaments 
cooperation, and cooperation in civil defense. Philip H. Gordon, 126. 
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president, the electoral system, and the national economic situation. To discuss the fifth 
Republic’s structure, I divided it according to phases to its presidency. 
After 1945, during the fourth Republic under President de Gaulle, France opted 
for a more Western orientation and a European-defined security policy with Germany as 
its core interests. Therefore, early on, France was willing to hand over national 
sovereignty in favor of a European organization. France agreed with the European 
Community treaties (1957), and de Gaulle launched, with the beginning of the fifth 
French Republic, a European initiative in which Germany would play a decisive role. 
However, in 1954, the European military alliance (EDC) failed because of domestic 
political resistance. In 1966, France decided to leave the integrated military structure of 
NATO, and, with the subsequent domestic unrests of 1968, the French European vision 
for a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural”165 failed. The Soviet invasion in the CSSR 
(1968) to quell civil uprising influenced French policy as well. 
Under President Pompidou, French European policy gave priority to economic 
issues, with a reinforced attempt at engagement within Europe, for example, the policy of 
détente and the international strengthening of the international role of Europe. It was 
determined, therefore, that European states would harmonize their economic and foreign 
policies. 
President Giscard d`Estaing found himself in an advantageous political situation: 
the United States was preoccupied with the Watergate crisis (1972-1974), Great Britain 
was not interested in deeper European integration, and Germany had a new government. 
The chance for active political formation was there.166 On the one hand, Giscard 
d`Estaing stressed improving France’s ties with the United States and NATO because he 
feared Europe would move too quickly toward an independent defense. On the other 
hand, he did more for the building of European Institutions than all his predecessors.167  
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Within the European economic integration and increasingly dense relations between 
France and Germany, the idea of a European federation, increased self-reliance, and a 
common security policy was born.  
The European concepts of President Mitterand (1981) and his socialist 
government included recommendation of a stronger role for France in both Europe and 
the greater world, as well as a special relationship with Germany, because the 
circumstances surrounding France’s security policy had fundamentally changed. The 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the retrofit of SS-20 missiles targeted at western 
Europe convinced France’s Socialist government “to adopt a firmer stand on the question 
of defense the Cold War was back, and the French wanted to help fight it.”168 In 
response, France postulated a European defense area with more responsibility for the 
west-Europeans. There is no doubt that the new approach toward NATO was combined 
with an insistence on national independence from NATO. 
Since 1995, the “neo-gaullist” President Chirac has maintained the existing 
security policy interests. His European security policy includes NATO, while trying to 
avoid conflicts with partners, especially the United States. The basic convictions of the 
French foreign and security policies have permeated through all phases of the French 
security policy. I turn now to an exploration of how France has turned those convictions 
into reality. 
 
1. France’s Rank in the World – Leadership in and with Europe 
At its center, France’s European policy has been driven by an overriding desire to 
regain and maintain France’s lost status as a great power. De Gaulle knew that by 
cooperating with the other European states, France was more likely to achieve its desired 
leading role. French governments after the end of World War II tried to use western 
European institutions and their own security structures to strengthen France’s overall 
power. To this end, it was first necessary for France to establish itself as a leader in 
Europe, to gain greater influence within the international system, to gain national weight 
and grandness, and to become a decisive power. Europe would play a role as well, but as 
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a compensative element, as a Western power in the East-West Conflict. After France’s 
loss of power at the close of World War II we can identify three phases of France’s 
political policies. First, France transferred its national ambitions onto partners in order to 
locate France under their overarching leadership as “global players.” In the next phase, 
cooperation within NATO was stressed in order to build support for a later move toward 
creating reinforced European security structures. France was thereby generally poised to 
cooperate within NATO, because it represented the only way to garner control and 
influence and potentially inhibit and prevent the European unification process. Gordon 
concludes that “the final attraction of a European security identity for French leaders 
seems to be as a tool for achieving French influence both within the alliance and 
throughout the world.”169 
In 1994, a French Defense White Paper described France’s desire to reinstitute 
itself as a world power and further its position in the new world-power structure,170 or at 
least draw France level with the United State’s perception of worldwide interests. At this 
point, “grandeur” and “indépendence” find themselves merged into a single policy. The 
most recent French governments accepted the premise that an enlarged, and, in terms of a 
security policy, a relevant Europe would need a bigger leadership group – not precluding 
that France could take over the leadership position within this group. 
 
2. Indepéndence – ESDP to Balance the Hegemon 
Since the time of De Gaulle, constant characteristics of French European policy 
have been an insistence on self-contained European foreign and security policies and to a 
clear differentiation of Europe as a whole from the United States. The French government 
have managed this by means of limited political conflicts, with no attempt to challenge 
the common nuclear security.171 France is only able to substantiate itself as a world 
power when acting collectively with its European neighbors. And because France needs a 
European power base to facilitate its world-power role, it is only able to achieve this aim 
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if American hegemony is reduced in Europe. Therefore, a transatlantic framework was a 
necessary precondition of a privileged French position within western Europe, as was 
cooperation with France’s partners with no loss of independence and the possibility of an 
independent western Europe. This was, in the first instance, dependent on the nuclear 
armament situation in the world. In the 1970s, European policies dead ended because of 
the détente policy and disarmament. In the 1980s, security and defense cooperation with 
Germany were intensified for two reasons. France wanted either to create an autonomous 
European option or to build a European “alliance within an alliance,” within NATO, to 
gain more influence over the preservation of France’s special status.172 France chose 
several options in the 1990s, but continued to follow its guidelines in the question of 
European politics: to reduce the influence of the United States in Europe, to slow down 
the European enlargement process, and to preserve France’s national identity.173 
With the end of the Cold War, several observers saw a chance to renew 
unfulfilled “Gaullist” visions. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, finding itself 
facing a unified Germany, France determined that new measures had to be taken: “the 
French have decided that the only way they can continue to play a leadership role in 
Europe – and that Europe can play a global role – is by sacrificing a measure of national 
independence on the altar of European integration.”174 Today it seems that France wants 
to limit the role of the United States, at least in Europe, and also to contain the newly 
reunified Germany within Europe. The concept of European strategic autonomy might 
then be conceivable within European Security and Defense Policy as the European pillar 
of NATO; however, this fails to fully explain French interest in pushing the development 
of European security and defense policies. With the German reunion, the old bilateral 
balance of power between France and Germany was disturbed. The only way open to the 
French, if they were unable to “contain” their powerful neighbor, would be to “embrace” 
him and bind him to themselves, and as effectively as possible, into the network of 
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European legislation.175 Special trust-building arrangements between France and 
Germany were aimed at enhancing institutionalized monetary cooperation by, for 
example the European Monetary System in 1979, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and the 
Monetary Union in 2002.176  
In the past, French interests had caused several conflicts with their European 
partners.177 Some French ideas about European autonomy within NATO failed; therefore 
a consensus of European nations was required. Their first preferred option for an 
independent European defense failed because of the special status of the “Force de 
Frappe,” the different security policy interests, and the definition of transatlantic 
relations. Recently however, with the Chirac government in power, France’s approach to 
NATO has become more visible. Certain discernments emerged under the political 
influence of the second Gulf War, the requirement for a “new world order” and, 
therefore, different force structures. France’s approach should ensure French influence 
and the control (autonomously in the future) of European security structures, which can 
be built with NATO, but not against NATO. However, already Chirac has implied that 
this European pole of defense “would somehow eventually replace NATO as the 
organization responsible at least for defending Europe.”178 
 
3. État Nation – Intergovernmental Cooperation 
Certainly, France was only interested in political cooperation between 
governments, not a supranational integration. Economic European integration supports 
French interests, but not the integration of security policies or military forces.179 After the 
end of the Cold War,  it was commonly expected that the French European-policy debate  
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about independence versus integration would come to an end, including separation from 
“Gaullism,” and that France would try to find equilibrium between nation-states and a 
supranational structure. 
Since, the policy of de Gaulle a “Europe of the Fatherlands” was in the special 
interest of France. The initiative of Giscard d`Estaing attached greater importance to 
common foreign and security policies. In 1974 the “European Council,” an assembly of 
the heads of government, was founded. Unfortunately this council was not used as a 
European-community organ, but as an autonomous carrier of national state sovereignty. 
In the engaged era of Mitterand and with the cognition to gain more weight within 
Europe and only with Europe in the world the EPZ (later GASP) was strengthened. The 
dualism between common (European) economic and domestic policies and 
intergovernmental foreign and security policies have to be examined separately, at least 
from the viewpoint of the relevant political French actors. Since 1981, within Mitterand`s 
incumbency there was a minor deviation, from the principle of continuity, to reject any 
deprivation of national power to the advantage of the EU. 
If the European Union wants to be a relevant, global political actor, it must be 
able and willing to act with or without NATO. This is not likely to be manageable if 
decisions are more dependent on intergovernmental than on integrative cooperation. The 
European constitution, when ratified by all EU member countries at the end of 2005, 
should help to solve this problem. 
 
E. FRENCH-GERMAN RELATIONS  
Until 1989, in terms of French-German relations, France was more responsible for 
foreign policy; Germany was more responsible for an economic policy with regard to a 
common European policy.180 The French foreign policy facing Germany can be divided 
into several phases. The preparation for a French-German bilateral relationship, began 
with the European Council treaties. De Gaulle’s initiative deepened the relationship with 
the Elysée treaty (1963), which excluded common cooperative security and defense 
policies. Next came a more passive phase, caused by the German “Ostpolitik” and policy 
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of détente (1963-1969).181 France was interested in the preservation of the status quo in 
terms of German partition and the “Westbindung.”182 Favorable German relations with 
eastern European states and French abstinence from NATO rigidified France’s interest in 
a German integration. Germany was interested in reintegrating France into NATO. As a 
result, negotiations by both countries, in 1989, resulted in the reactivation of a “privileged 
bilateral relationship” that focused on security and defense policies.183 In the subsequent 
two years, France put forward several proposals that, at the end, described a “true 
security policy that would ultimately lead to a common defense.”184 
Since 1990, relations between the countries have become more normalized. 
Germany has gained even more influence in terms of security policies since its 
reunification, giving both countries more confidence in mutual cooperation and 
negotiations. With respect to European integration, both countries have resolved their 
various internal conflicts as well. One example was the EU summit in Nice, where 
advantages in favor of Germany were contractually documented in the voting patterns of 
the European council and the parliament.185 It’s obvious that French desires for European 
autonomy stood in direct opposition to Germany’s realization of favored transatlantic 
relations, a dilemma that influenced French-German security cooperation from the 
beginning. 
So far, there has been no real possibility of winning German support as a partner 
for an autonomous Europe. Due to the West European Union (WEU) – the old desire for 
European defense – and despite the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, there has been no 
other viable alternative for the France except to use NATO to secure its influence over 
Germany, in Europe, and in the world. The interests of both countries converge in NATO 
and the EU, where they work to decrease their strategic dependence on the United States. 
However, this means that both countries, especially Germany, will be dependent on 
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ESDP, which continues to evolve very slowly. The European political union and a 
stronger WEU were formally accepted at Maastricht, but several nations, Great Britain, 
the Netherlands, and Portugal, for example, still believe that “European efforts should 
remain under NATO’s umbrella.”186 Common foreign and security policies remained the 
only intergovernmental pillar of the European Union.  
The draft of the European constitution, which has yet be ratified by the EU 
member states, appears to be big step forward in direction of ESDP. Article I-12 of the 
EU constitution includes provisions outlining the Union’s cooperation in matters of 
common foreign and security policies. They will cover all areas of foreign policy and all 
questions relating to the Union’s security, as well as a progressive framing of common 
defense policies.187 Due to the principal of unanimity, however, each member state also 
retains the right to veto, corresponding with the French paradigm of sovereignty. Despite 
all its declarations, France remains firm on its stance concerning autonomy. At the same 
time, until very recently, the German principle of multinational fixation on its own 
foreign and security policies failed to gain support. 
Since Maastricht, the French-German initiatives for ESDP have set their 
collective sights on an ambitious aim. Over the course of the various debates concerning 
federalism that occurred between 1999 and 2002, French-German differences have 
become clear. Commonalties as to the role of the national state, the conception of 
European tasks generally, and the global role of Europe leave no doubt about their 
different interests in a federally organized Europe. Both states support a federal structure, 
but France does not accept the German approach of a real European government and an 
upgrade of the European parliament, because this would weaken the European council 
and its various member states. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that France’s statecraft and its security-
policy interests share a common history. These primarily Gaullist interests are the 
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functional basis of France’s security-oriented European policy. After World War II, 
France’s relations with Germany – soon its closest European partner – showed 
differences, sometimes conflicts. Even today the conflicts between integration with other 
nations and self-integration remain a problem. French policies are good examples of how 
an autonomous defense can be combined with the willingness to cooperate. 
It would be faulty, however, to believe that Europe can be organized without the 
abandonment of sovereignty. France’s desire to be a weighty strategic protagonist in a 
multipolar world has its price. Gaullist policies were implemented (as described in 
Chapter II) at a time when the United States dominated the Atlantic alliance, the Soviet 
threat hung heavily over a bipolar world, the Europeans were not able to defend 
themselves and had basic disagreements among themselves. All these factors are 
changing, or have already changed, and French policies have changed as a result. Further 
development of the European unity seems to be the most promising way to overcome 
traditional models of strategic order in a globalized world; however, these are not 
adequate to the tasks facing Europe in the multipolar reality of the new world order. This 
is surely true for the French basic convictions état nation and indépendence. Grandeur 
(rank) could be conserved in cooperation with the France’s European neighbors, because 
only in conjunction with its neighbors is France able to exercise the influence it claims 
for itself. The time of the importance of force de frappe, and the policy of the “empty 
chair,” is obviously over. Not long ago, France was able to influence world policy 
directly. From now on, France will try to extend its influence at the expense of Europe as 
a whole. Through its influence and control over European foreign and security policies, 
France is able to exercise coleadership. But NATO membership under the leadership of 
another great power and participation in ad-hoc alliances188 as an unattached global 
protagonist is not a realistic option for France.189 With a “European pole of defense” in 
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world policy, France can enlarge its scope. In sum, that is why France will continue to be 
interested in global acting and in a Europe that is as independent as possible. To achieve 
these goals, France must take three things into consideration. First, Europe needs more 
self-reliance; second, France’s basic convictions must be adapted to European interests; 
and third, a further approach to the Atlantic Alliance. All these conditions are also in 
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V. THE FUTURE OF NATO: IS NATO ADEQUATE TO THE TO 
THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY? 
A. INTRODUCTION: TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS WITHIN THE 
NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 
Is NATO adequate to the challenges of the twenty-first century? Or is NATO, 
optimized to the conditions of the Cold War, damned to irrelevance? The dispute about 
the future of NATO is as old as 1949. But under the threat of current global challenges 
such as “world-wide terrorism, proliferation of WMD, poverty and disease, AIDS, water 
scarcity, global warming or migratory movements with economic measures”190 the 
debate about NATO’s relevance has become acrimonious. The terrorist attacks of 
September 11 and the resulting United States decision, despite the immediate invocation 
of Article 5 of the NATO charter, not to use NATO command structures in the war 
against terrorism, provoked discussions about the viability of the Alliance.191 One reason 
is, surely, that there are deep disagreements about the weight given to political versus 
military solutions in resolving such crises.192 As a consequence of the unipolar action of 
the United States, the Europeans have developed their own independent ESDP. 
If NATO does indeed become an Alliance of opportunities for most Europeans, 
and a toolbox for the United States, then the best days of the Alliance are over, because, 
in its worldwide war against terrorism, the United States has decided to forgo the use of 
NATO. And European’s, in response, have developed their own defense structures and 
capabilities. This process once more broaches the question what future benefit or utility 
does this Alliance still possess?193 In Chapter V., I will argue that NATO’s capacity to 
act militarily has always been proportionately equal to its member’s collective security 
policy, which has also served to justify NATO’s credibility. Helga Haftendorn stresses in 
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her current study that “the members of NATO engage only then with their whole 
strength, when their own security interests are affected or when collective interests advise 
cooperation ... the lack of an external threat opens political solo efforts which would be 
very dangerous during the time of the East-west confrontation.”194 From this, it follows 
that the main question to answer is whether or not NATO’s partners on both sides of the 
Atlantic are still willing to maintain a militarily capable North Atlantic Alliance. This 
chapter will focus the roles of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, because the 
differences in their positions within NATO are most significant. 
 
B. PERSPECTIVES OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP 
The structure of the American and the European society, with their inherent the 
principles of democracy, liberalism, and individual human rights represent the 
transatlantic cultural clip. This does not change the fact that life and perceptions differ 
significantly on both sides of the Atlantic.195 Both Americans and Europeans feel obliged 
to live by the principles of democracy, liberty, equality, and a market economy, but their 
perceptions of how to deal with current and future global threats are presently different. 
However, the building and adherence of alliances is of special importance because 
the described value community is unique in the world. This supports endeavors to ensure 
long-term reliability in building alliances.196 While the United States has periodically 
published a security strategy and thus made its security interests public, the EU followed 
this example for the first time in December 2003, with the issuance of the European 
Security Strategy (ESS).197 
The security interests of the United States and the EU, as described in Chapter III, 
are in agreement. It is their declared aim to secure the Western value system against 
instability or threats from outside by “enlargement,” which is clearly identified as both a 
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United States and a European security interest. One key difference in Europe is that states 
like those in the Baltic, Poland, and south-east Europe feel safer in NATO with United 
States than in the EU, where they attempt to protect their own interests by levying 
provisos against the leading French-German claims.198 
Despite their apparent agreement in terms of strategy, a significant debate exists 
between the United States and Europe as to the proper way to secure the Western value 
system against instability and threats from outside. This debate has become increasingly 
heated and more controversial. The European self-image is such that it places primacy on 
“civil power,” with war being seen more as a means of last resort. As such, the 
Europeans, main interest is to preserve the defensive character of NATO.199 
Nevertheless, as shown in Chapter IV, there are differing foreign-policy interests 
in Europe. Most significant is the French policy, dedicated to building up a European 
power that is able to balance the American hegemony. In contrast to France, Great Britain 
supports a transatlantic community that defines itself as in a “special relationship” with 
the United States. The role of “facilitator,” especially between France and United States, 
has, in past decades, been fulfilled by Germany. It impelled the unification and the 
reinforcement of the European Union but, at the same time, supported for the anchoring 
of the United States in Europe. Germany would benefit from maintaining this role, but, 
through its biased approach to the United States, the current German Socialist/Green 
government has discredited itself as a facilitator.200 
The United States, acting as the “benevolent hegemon,” possesses by the ability to 
limit the hegemonic interests of individual European states and, therefore maintains the 
mechanism through which European unification was possible.201 Nevertheless, since the 
1999 Kosovo war, the more and more institutionalized security and defense policy 
(ESDP) of the European Union can also, be perceived as a challenge to the United 
States.202 
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The core of the U.S. security policy interest is the maintenance of its dominant 
position in the international system. In addition, the United States stresses the necessity 
and importance of an international regime and organizations and makes NATO, at least in 
its NSS, a top priority.203 
In contrast, until the end of the twentieth century NATO’s European alliance 
members possessed neither the will nor the capability to develop a security concept that 
surpassed Europe’s borders. This fact and success of operation Allied Force against 
Yugoslavia in 1999 raised questions about NATO’s capability to act militarily. The 
terrorist attacks of September 11 and the resulting United States decision not to use 
NATO command structures in the war against terrorism, despite the immediate 
invocation of NATO’s Article 5, provoked discussions about the end of the Alliance. 
That was the general political climate in which the 2002 Prague summit took place. 
 
1. The Prague Summit: Transformation of NATO 
One of the main goals of the Prague summit of November 2002 was to discuss 
and facilitate the continued maintenance and enlargement of the Alliance. This topic had 
been removed after the meeting of NATO defense ministers in June of that year and the 
discussion of security interests after September 11, 2001. 
During an informal meeting of the defense ministers on September 24th, 2002, in 
Warsaw, the United States defense minister proposed to build up a rapid reaction force, 
the NATO Response Force (NRF). The summit in Prague, which was planned as an 
“enlargement summit,” changed its official character and was seen thereafter as a 
“Transformation summit” in terms of public perception.204 Therefore, members were 
officially given notice that NATO was in a transformation process, a continual process of 
adaptation and renewal.205 
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The impulse for the transformation of NATO required an updated threat analysis. 
The combat of worldwide terrorism moved into the center of consideration and led to the 
conclusion that the abilities of NATO had to be adjusted. NATO was oriented to the U.S. 
National Security Strategy, which stated a need for a worldwide deployable force.206 
Before the planned invitation of new candidates  Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia  the Prague summit emphasized that 
“Effective military forces are an essential part of our overall strategy, are vital to 
safeguard the freedom and security of our populations and to contribute to peace and 
security in the Euro-Atlantic region.”207 To achieve that, the NATO members decided to 
create a NATO reaction force, the NATO Response Force (NRF), to streamline the 
NATO command structure in Europe, and to improve and develop new capabilities for 
military warfare in a high-threat environment (Prague Capabilities Commitment).208 
At the center of these decisions was the United States initiative for a NATO 
Response Force, which required a rehashing of NATO’s ability to act against terrorism, a 
mostly external threat. Thus, NATO’s capacity to act was seen quite differently than it 
had been during 1999 Washington summit, where NATO’s need to act was perceived as 
being bound by no geographical borders. Finally, all NATO member states affirmed that 
they were “determined to deter, disrupt, defend and protect, against any attacks on us in 
accordance with the Washington treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.”209 The 
influence of the U.S. National Security Strategy the declaration of the 2002Prague 
summit is obvious. 
 
2. Implementation of the Prague Summit Decisions 
To answer the medium- and long-term future of the Prague summit decisions, it is 
necessary to investigate some short-term results of the summit. The plan for the building 
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of the NATO Response Force (NRF), the schedule and its adherence offers a first answer, 
if the nations really agree upon their declared aims to reform NATO. The NRF should 
consist of 21,000 soldiers for all the tasks of the NATO spectrum and, within a lead time 
of 5 to 30 days be deployable worldwide. The NRF should be ready for action as soon as 
possible, but no later than 2006.210 Some European Alliance members were initially 
hesitant because they presumed a United States disturbance in reaction to the already 
decided European Crisis Reaction Forces under the Helsinki headline goal of the EU.211 
However, the aim of the United States initiative was planned not only to levy a 
new contingent possessing special task capabilities as intervention troops, but also as a 
means to improve the military capabilities of NATO partner nations.212 The prospect of 
increasing the Alliance capability to act was what had first attracted its members. Many 
member states followed a strategy focused on niche capabilities and saving money.213 At 
the same time, those developments raised questions. The relation between the NRF and 
the EU intervention force was, for those states, of special importance, because they were 
members of both NATO and the EU. The EU intervention force was primarily planned to 
fulfill the “Petersberg tasks” under the European headline goal.214 Until the June 2003 
NATO summit, there was congruity that the EU intervention force must be integrated 
into command structures which had yet to be created. In the case of a possible 
overlapping in the fields of the mission spectrum or force equivalents, the political tasks 
of the NRF and the EU forces can be seen as complementary: they complete one another. 
The  EU  acknowledged  the  necessity  to  carry  out  a  verification and, if necessary, an  
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updating of the Petersberg tasks, “but stopped short before expanding the Petersberg 
tasks.”215 Not until the terrorist bombings in Madrid did EU leaders issue a new 
declaration on combating terrorism.216  
However, NATO and EU national forces were disposable only once the will of all 
participating nations was challenged to find a common solution: “but it was far from clear 
that all Europeans have accepted the high-intensity missions for which the United States 
military is being designed.”217 
With this background, on June 12th, 2003, the NATO defense ministers passed 
the political and military concept for the NRF: a “tiered readiness joint force; 
expeditionary in character and design, able to execute the full range of missions: peace to 
a high-intensity war fight.”218 On July 16th, a “Force Generation Conference” for the first 
two readiness phases took place as the so-called NRF1 and NRF2. On October 13th, 
2004, the NATO Secretary General formally announced that the NRF had reached its 
initial operational capability. The NRF is expected to reach its full operational capability 
by October 2006.219 
In fact, NATO was able to redeem the challenging schedule. NRF 1 was put into 
commission on October 1st, eleven months after the Prague summit. The European side 
provided all immediately available forces. The implicit function of the NRF  to work as a 
“catalyst” for the transformation of the European forces  was not sufficient. The Prague 
Capabilities Commitment (PCC) requested improvement of the military capabilities for 
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modern operations.220 The first steps in that direction, made in 2003, got a bad write-up, 
in contrast to the structural building of the NRF.221 
In addition, it is necessary to make sure that the effectiveness of the elaborately 
compiled NRF intervention force is not restricted by national provisos and political- 
decision processes, which must be accommodated. This is valid for parliamentary 
procedures in the member states and for the mechanisms in the corresponding NATO 
caucus. Up to the present, all members have intended that the principle of unanimity of 
NATO would also be valid for NRF missions. The question as to the legitimacy of NRF 
missions also has to be clarified. NATO commander General James Jones was right when 
he stated that “in the future nations would have to consider whether the opposition of one 
or two nations could continually stymie the will of the majority.”222 
The current development to achieve an effective contribution to the NRF and to 
allow its action in the case of emergency will be a decisive issue for the future of the 
Alliance. 
 
3. The 2004 Istanbul Summit: A Summit of Discontent 
With the decisions of the Prague summit, the Alliance seemed to have made great 
progress, not only in handling the terrorist challenge better than in the past, but also to 
reaching consent within NATO. The decision of the United States and Great Britain to 
intervene in Iraq, without a United Nation’s mandate, split the Transatlantic Alliance, as 
well as Europe in general.223 On the other hand, the United States was supported by no 
less than sixteen of the twenty-six NATO members, even though they provided that 
 
220 Like the 1999 Washington summit, which launched the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI), the 
PCC is aimed at improving members` operational capabilities to address evolving defense needs. PCC is 
monitored by a group of representatives of NATO. But PCC is much more explicitly and narrowly drawn 
than DCI. It calls alliance, and nuclear defense; Intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; Air to 
ground surveillance; members to make commitments concerning their military capabilities in eight specific 
areas: Chemical, biological, radiological Command, control, and communications; Combat effectiveness, 
including PGM`s and suppression of enemy air defenses; Strategic air and sea lift; Air to air refueling; and 
Deployable combat support and combat service support units. Carl W. Ek, 4. 
221 Carl W. Ek, 6. 
222 Michael Smith, New Force Will End Specter of French-Dominated Euro Army, November 22nd, 
2002, http://www.telegraph.co.uk. (accessed February 20, 2005). 
223 Helga Haftendorn, 8. 
75 
                                                
support with only a small number of forces.224 The Istanbul summit of June 2004 
occurred at a time when the discontent in the Alliance about the United States invasion of 
Iraq was being discussed with great vehemence. It was hoped the conference would 
overcome the differences surrounding the Iraq question and bring the Alliance partners to 
coherence again.225 
However, the European governments stressed that, even if military action is 
occasionally necessary, they largely prefer political measures to counter global threats.226 
For the near future it would be difficult to persuade the European populations to join the 
United States in military operations.227 Nevertheless, the Istanbul summit communiqué 
invoked a full commitment to the collective defense of NATO member populations, 
territory, and forces. It stressed that “transatlantic cooperation is essential in defending 
our values and meeting common threats and challenges, from wherever they will 
come.”228 Despite all differences about the unilateral United States action against Iraq, all 
sides were still willing to continue to shape a global military capability within the North 
Atlantic Alliance. During the summit, members noted with satisfaction that one of the 
two initiatives to revitalize the alliance was on schedule: the NRF force would be fully 
operational by 2006.229 The PCC, however, with its eight capability goals, seemed to be a 
failure; only the Chemical/Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense battalion had 
become fully operational. There are still shortfalls also in the strategic airlift and aerial 
refuelers and those PCC goals are unlikely to be met on schedule.230 
At NATO’s third military capability conference in November 2004, EU officials 
agreed to initiate the creation of thirteen battle groups. Each battle group would be built 
by two nations and would include non-EU members. One battle group was scheduled to 
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be ready for action by 2005 or 2006, and the deadline for all thirteen battle groups to be 
fully operational was set for 2007.231 Unfortunately, members have yet to determine what 
the operative concept will be and where the most probable theaters for these new battle 
groups will be.232 
 
4. The Future of the North Atlantic Alliance 
Whether NATO fails or succeeds depends on whether or not a viable solution to 
the disputed differences within the transatlantic Alliance can be achieved. In its provision 
of adequate military capabilities, Europe has to fulfill United States expectations. In 
return, the United States must allow participation in solving security policy issues and 
accept, to some extent, the independence of the European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP).233 The policy will be backed up by a military arm capable of managing a full 
spectrum of crisis-management tasks. It is conceivable that NATO states on both sides of 
the Atlantic may be unable to find a common satisfactory solution, leaving them 
incapable of acting in their collective interests. NATO would then cease to exist as a 
regional defense organization focused on Europe. As for the United States, such an 
instrument would allow them to continue to have influence on European political 
decisions. However, in the long term, the members of NATO would eventually ask the 
central question: How much are we willing to spend for an alliance whose only function 
is its ability to ensure stability transfer in Europe without the military capability to act? 
Furthermore, it is questionable how such an alliance would differentiate itself from other 
organizations in Europe. Especially as, with the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), there is already an organization which deals that security 
policy issues in Europe and that has a transatlantic reach.234 NATO would be 
marginalized in Europe. This scenario however, is not probable. 
Despite the problems the Europeans obviously have with the implementation of 
the “decision of transformation,” it is probable that they will continue to achieve the 
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specified results. With the creation of a European Security Strategy (ESS), Europe has 
shown its will to develop foreign and security policy concepts. While the language of the 
ESS is sometimes vague, all EU members can find their own interests in it. The ESS can 
be seen as a further milestone on the way to a serious European defense contribution as a 
second pillar within NATO.235 Reference to “preventive action” shows clearly the 
similarity between the ESS and the NSS. It will be the cornerstone of corresponding 
NATO missions. 
That the necessity for more flexibility in military operations is recognized by 
European parliaments shows the Germany’s interest in “deployment law.”236 National 
parliamentary control will prevent precipitate military involvement and future actions that 
violate the common interests and values. In marked contrast to those circumstances, 
“national caveats” that impede operations have to be avoided. Governments that 
contribute forces to an allied mission must not impose restrictions on that tasks those 
forces may undertake.237 
With the decision to build a European Defense Agency (EDA), Europe is 
undertaking an important step in the improvement of its collective military capability.238 
By combining of interests Europe can take the important first steps toward transformation 
without increasing defense expenditures that can thus be used to build the necessary 
capabilities of the NRF-force. 
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In the European Security Strategy and in the not-yet-ratified draft of the EU 
constitution, the importance attached to NATO and their right of access to the regulation 
of conflicts is stressed. With the installation of a European liaison cell among the NATO 
staff, the EU plans to coordinate with NATO, according to the Berlin Plus agreements.239 
Therewith, the European Alliance partners demonstrate goodwill in response to U.S. 
worries regarding independent European security structures. In this area, several conflicts 
are preprogrammed because, with the takeover of more responsibilities as “European 
pillar in NATO” and with better military capabilities, the Europeans will develop more 
self-confidence.240 The initiation of a “new transatlantic dialogue” could restore the right 
balance to the Alliance again. In this dialogue one thing should be clear. The United 
States is able “to realize its security interest without NATO, but without the United States 
NATO has no continuance.”241 The idea of balancing the United States with European 
Security and Defense Policy is neither realistic, nor useful. 
However, with an appropriate takeover of responsibility by the European Allies, 
combined with cooperative behavior, the United States may come to European 
peculiarities at the end. The United States will, in the long term especially, because it 
cannot, for cultural reasons withhold rights that it claims for itself from an equivalent 
partner in a value-and-interest community like NATO.242 
The United States interest in “burden sharing” shows that basic multilateral 
approaches will be pursued where the capabilities of the European allies promise easing 
of the burden. The examples of Afghanistan and Iraq show clearly that, after an extensive 
benefit-cost analysis, the United States has an interest in acting within the scope of 
NATO. Owing to today’s NATO military capabilities, such a benefit-cost analysis will 
probably not reveal itself until the post-conflict phase.243 This frustrating situation will 
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not end until the military capabilities of the European members of NATO are upgraded. 
The result may be “burden sharing” with equal rights and duties. 
NATO, because of its orientation toward the U.S. National Security Strategy, is 
well on the way to developing global military capabilities. In public discussions in 
Europe, that policy aspect is noted and sometimes criticized as the NATO “World police” 
role. It is very important for the legitimacy of NATO in that respect to design transparent 
decision mechanisms for NATO missions. For Europeans especially, the United Nations 
(UN) is viewed as the strongest source of legitimacy. All NATO partners agree that a UN 
Security Council decision should be the basis for NATO to act. The experiences of the 
Iraq war since 2003 show that reforms of the UN are necessary to strengthen its 
legitimizing role for the future. The Kosovo war set a precedent, however, that in a 
special situation, NATO members decided to act without a UN mandate. It remains to be 
seen whether that case, will in retrospective be judged as a breach of international law or 
as a further development of international law; but the fact remains that sovereign states 
saw the necessity to act in response to the blatant violation of human rights, showing that 
organizations that are unable to resolve such problem situations may come under 
international pressure. 
NATO may have to legitimize itself through its military capacity to act. If so, the 
NATO of the future will gain increased importance through its participation in an 
formation of military coalitions. Already today, the Alliance has the model framework for 
building “ad hoc alliances.” The Alliance of the future will have improved capabilities, in 
particular, in the form of NRF. Those will be, especially in the case of short-term 
missions, the first-choice forces. Long-term missions must to be supported by other 
forces: that opens the field to “ad hoc coalitions of the willing.” In addition, tailored 
forces must be trained for long-term missions in different locations. NATO-structures are 
the blueprint, therefore, that has to be followed by Alliance partners. It is not necessary 
for all partners to participate in a mission. Already the NATO treaty from 1955 allows 
member states, in the case of collective defense, to provide the means they consider 
necessary. Besides the member states, non member states can also be admitted, given the 
option of adding “ad-hoc” forces. The feared reduction of NATO to a toolbox of the 
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United States can prevented by these mechanisms and changed to an effective concept.244 
Eventually, these kinds of efficient instruments, like the NRF, will increase NATO’s 
strength, confidence, and capacity to act. 
The tendency to bring NATO into the worldwide mission before the completion 
of the transformation measures shows the future direction that the Alliance must go. 
Surely the Alliance will have to deal with differences in the future, but at least in mid-
term there is no replacement for NATO. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
The credibility of NATO has depended since its foundation on its political and 
military capability to act. Historically, relations between the United States and its 
European Alliance partners have been anything but excellent. At the same time, NATO 
has faced and survived many internal crises, such as France’s 1966 withdrawal from the 
alliances integrated military structure. Both questions how to respond to the Soviet 
aggression against Afghanistan (1980), and the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons in Europe (early 1980s) temporarily intensified tensions within the transatlantic 
relationship. After the end of the Cold War, the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the 
resulting United States decision, despite the immediate invocation of Article 5, not to use 
NATO command structures in the war against terrorism, once again provoked discussions 
about the nature of the alliance. 
NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history, but during the war in 
Afghanistan the United States relied mainly on its own capabilities. Only a few units of 
special forces from chosen countries were accepted to support the United States in this 
war. One reason for the decision was that the Allies lacked the military capabilities to 
maintain speedy war with minimum civilian and military casualties. Another reason was 
surely the lack of NATO interoperability.245 
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However, EU and U.S. cultural commonalties, security interests, of the United 
States and the EU and decades-old institutional experiences with NATO ultimately drove 
the Alliance partners to transform NATO into an organization with a military capacity to 
act globally. To achieve implementation of that great plan, the common was not enough. 
NATO is now involved in a context that continuing process of coordination in which 
political disputes can only be expected. It was within that context that the NATO 
Secretary General, his November 2004 speech, called for the development of a “dispute 
culture” inside NATO. “Only an alliance which does not evade critical questions and 
does not eschew the dispute can play a political role.”246  
The desired flexibility will invariably reinforce the transformation process. Ad 
hoc coalitions and coalitions of the willing will come into existence in and through 
NATO and NATO will bind them institutionally. A sufficient military capability to act 
worldwide will distinguish NATO from similar organizations and reconstitute the 
attractiveness of the Alliance. A change to a politically more inward organization 
focussed on Europe, like the OSCE, can be precluded. It is in Germany’s vital interests 
that NATO continue to be the leading military organization in the world, that goes into 
action if military engagement is necessary beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. The European 
Defense and Security policy will focus on stabilization and reconstruction missions 
within the Petersberg tasks in Europe. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION: A WORLD WITHOUT THREATS 
Two specific occurrences have decisively modified the international security 
landscape: the end of the Cold War period and the dramatic increase and volume of threat 
of international terrorism. The terrorist attacks of September 11 caused a paradigm 
change in American foreign and security policies. In the twentieth century United States 
security was dependent on the prevention of the occupation by a European power of the 
Eurasian area. This was accomplished with the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Since 
then, the United States has no important rival. After 9/11 U.S. foreign and security 
policies turned logically toward weak and rogue states that support terrorism coining a 
philosophy of “regime change.” The United States had finally answered on the stage of 
twenty-first century world polictics. 
In contrast, since 1991, and despite spates of international terrorism, the security 
situation has been better in Europe than it was during the Cold War period. Though some 
interstate conflicts continue in various countries, there is also a broad general believe that 
disputes can be solved by peaceful means. 
This thesis attempts to determine whether the presence or absence of external 
threats will be the main determinant whether or not Europe and the United States 
continue to cooperate in security alliances. The European Security Strategy shows that 
there are serious security issues threatening Europe that are different than the classical 
ones. Significantly the invocation of Article 5 of the NATO treaty in the aftermath of 
September 11 was not sufficient to gather the Western nations behind United States 
leadership in the same way that the Cold War confrontation between the two nuclear 
superpowers had done. The United States decision, despite the immediate invocation of 
Article 5, not to use NATO command structures in the war against terrorism, provoked 
alarming discussions about the continued viability of the Alliance.247 Alliances such as 
NATO, which were established in response to imminent security threats, not economic, 
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environmental or human-rights issues, had therefore to address a central question: where 
they still necessary or were there other, perhaps better, options for addressing the newly 
emerging threat of non-nation, clandestine terrorist groups such as al Quaeda. 
With the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and the liberation of the Soviet Union 
satellite states, numerous east European countries have applied for membership in 
NATO. Those countries independent of their membership in the EU, feel safer and more 
protected from the United States dominance in NATO, than through a European Union 
dominated by France and Germany. So NATO, the EU, and other organizations are now 
forced to struggle with the competitive interests of their members. The question 
remaining is: what motivates the United States to maintain its membership in NATO?  
First, alliances can be catalysts providing the United States with opportunities to 
exercise its superior influence through collective bargaining and monetary negotiations. 
Membership in NATO permits burden-sharing in maintaining world order. The increase 
in burden-sharing has led to a shifting of burdens, which has directly inspired European 
deliberations to create their own independent European Security and Defense Policies, 
regardless of whether or not the United States still views itself as a European leader. The 
European Security and Defense Policy was feared at all times as an idea “undermining 
the alliances` integrated military structure.”248 It was possible for the United States to 
persuade it allies, before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1991), to endorse the 
Rome declaration (1991). That confirmed that NATO “is the essential forum for 
consultation and the locus of decision for agreements regarding the security commitments 
of the allies arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty.”249 Since the experience of the 
Kosovo campaign (1999), there is no way to stop the emerging ESDP. 
For the United States international stability is the most important issue, because it 
ensures the continued maintenance of trade relations and prevents the emergence of 
second superpower. But France is able to substantiate itself as a world power by acting 
collectively with its European neighbors. And because France needs a European-power 
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base to facilitate its world-power role, it can achieve this aim only if American hegemony 
is diluted back in Europe. The United States, not surprisingly, view France’s intention to 
balance the United States as completely inappropriate. That is why “some United States 
observers characterize France as antagonist.”250 Apparently, what the United States 
actually wants is to discourage any and all large industrial nations from challenging its 
leadership and the current political and economic world order.251 One question remains 
through: How can Europe, in the long run, succeed in providing its own security and still 
maintain and support its interests in the global community if the United States pulls out 
of Europe, especially in instances requiring military intervention? 
 
B. MULTILATERALISM VERSUS UNILATERALISM 
Marc Trachtenberg argues that the current United States administration is no more 
unilateralist, in fundamentally, than American administrations have been in the past. To 
the contrary, he stresses the example of the Kennedy administration, which put great 
pressure on the German government in 1963 to vote against German chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer and, eventually succeed in forcing him out of office.252 The Cuban missile 
crisis, another example, would certainly have resulted in a third World War had the 
Soviets not relented. After all the threat posed by the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba 
was no greater for the United States than that posed by United States missiles in Turkey 
aimed at the Soviet Union. 
However, the Wilsonian tradition of foreign policy tried to pursue a policy 
through institutions at the regional and the international level (e.g. League of Nations, 
United Nations). The current United States administration is pushing for the American 
vision of democracy and sees states as the key actors. Like stressed in the National 
Security Strategy stability will come from democratic states that act peacefully with each 
other. Values and norms anchored in the international institutions and law are perceived 
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as less capable to solve future international problems. In marked contrast to this approach 
the European Security Strategy which is unequivocal in its commitment to the United 
Nations charter. The European priority is to strengthen this institution and support it with 
all necessary means at its disposal. The aim is “an international order based on effective 
multilateralism.” 
Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the successions of weak Russian 
state, many Europeans feel they no longer need the United States as much as they once 
did.“ Europeans no longer think in Cold War political terms.”253 Trachtenberg explains 
the difference this way that with the lack of a unifying external threat  the threat of a 
Soviet–U.S. nuclear war  Europeans are much more willing to oppose the United States 
when they do not agree with U.S. policies and behavior.254 In addition, France is 
attempting to extend its own influence at the expense of Europe as a whole. Through its 
influence and control over European foreign and security policies, France exercises de-
facto leadership in Europe. As a “European pole of defense” in world politics, France can 
enlarge its scope. France continues to be interested in global acting and, therefore, has a 
self-serving political need to keep Europe as independent as possible. To reclaim their 
previously diminished role in the international system, France tries to balance American 
“hyper-power” through the European Union, regardless of whether such actions are in the 
best interests of Germany or France’s other European neighbors. Insisting on the equality 
of the EU and the transatlantic Alliance, German foreign policy is anchored in both 
worlds, secure from both. The creation of strong military competition between the EU 
and United States in any form would only serve to further marginalize the European 
Union and cause an internal division of force. The idea of balancing the “Hegemon” is 
not only counterproductive, but also unrealistic for Europe. In addition it would support 
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C. TRANSATLANTICISM VERSUS INDEPENDENCE 
France’s and Germany’s refusal to support the United States in the Iraq war has 
decisively weakened NATO. As Elisabeth Pond shows, “the alliances uninstitutionalized 
core of trust has been violated. That may be the hardest to restore.”255 Thus a new basis 
for the transatlantic relations must be found before the continued drift becomes 
separation. The EU is well advised to seek for an shoulder to shoulder stance with the 
United States and at the same time to develop its own potential of a foreign, security, and 
defense policy. 
The first steps are taken. The European Security Strategy goes much further than 
any European statement in accepting the United States post-9/11 threat assessment. The 
interaction between terrorist groups, proliferation of WMD, failed states, and organized 
crime are identified as the main dangers in both the ESS and the U.S. Security Strategy. 
Both documents also allow for preventive action in extraordinary cases, also there is no 
mention of “preemption” in the ESS. With continuing progress, the EU`s with its ESDP 
will increasingly become the primary security institution for Europe and the role 
Europeans shape for themselves on the world stage will most likely be projected through 
it. During his 2005 visit to the EU institutions in Brussels, President Bush stressed that 
“the United States wants the European project to succeed” and that a “strong Europe” is 
in the United States interest.256 
However, if the emergence of China and India two new global actors, should 
transform the geopolitical world landscape, we will need new ideas and responses to 
address our global security needs. The world economy is projected to be about 80 percent 
larger in 2020.257 The accompanying demand for energy, raw materials, and water will 
increase rapidly, and economic competition will greatly accelerate. The European Union 
and the United States must take an active interest in securing and maintaining access to 
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those essential resources  even through military means if and when necessary.258 This is 
provides yet another reason why, in the long run, the EU will be dependent on NATO. 
Furthermore, it is not acceptable that fundamental religious dictatorships control the 
world’s oil resources or support terrorists, or that countries are able to extort the Western 
world with Weapons of Mass Destruction. The EU will be chastened by these needs. 
The key to future global security will be determined by the ability of nations to 
act together when necessary, through the will to act cannot be forced, the progress the EU 
has made since the Treaty of Maastricht is remarkable and cannot be dismissed. The 
whole project, however, is still in an embryonic state, as was demonstrated by the EU’s 
almost complete inability to react in common to the 2004 tsunami catastrophe in Asia. It 
is high time that Europe get its act together. As is argued here and elsewhere, the EU 
needs to develop capable joint rapid-response forces and effective means of military 
transportation and communication. The forces should be trained to operate in 
international environments and be able to cooperate multilaterally. The EU will remain 
dependent on NATO to act outside of Europe. European total independence in terms of 
security is unusual. 
 
D. INTEGRATION VERSUS SOVEREIGNTY 
Europe’s integration of sovereign states who voluntarily relinquish sovereignty 
into a political union in a global world is a challenging and historically unique project. 
Europe’s collective experience has coalesced into a cognition that single nations are too 
small to find the right answers to collective questions of vital importance and that 
Europe’s future in a globalized world lies in the deepening of regional cooperation and 
integration. However, the EU will continue to run well as long as the economical uplift is 
guaranteed. Germany is the main monetary contributor to the European Union. Europe’s 
appeal, especially for east European countries, but also for Turkey and others, is its 
economical success. Economical progress is the main reason countries want to join; long-
term economical failure would be poison for the EU. If, in the long run, countries no 
longer have that economical advantage, as would be the case if Germany were unable to 
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continue as the main contributor of EU-payments, the EU could break apart.259 Who then 
would guarantee European security? Germany is well advised to continue beneficial 
transatlantic relations while, at the same time seeking deeper European integration. In 
contrast, it is inadvisable for Germany to commit itself to unstable alliances like Peking, 
Moscow, Berlin, and Paris axis against the 2003 Gulf war. 
The Euro-Atlantic community must be seen in front of this background under the 
new global circumstances onto a regenerated and more stabile basis. Worldwide cannot 
be solved without the United States and, therefore, it is high time to start a new 
transatlantic dialogue to explore solutions for our mutual future security. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
My investigation demonstrates that the character and behavior of Western 
alliances, as exhibited by NATO, are such that a close relationship exists between the 
presence of a credible threat and the collective capacity to act as a cohesive alliance. I 
argue that in any given time period, the absence or presence of an overarching threat will 
dictate how Western alliances function. Indeed, in times of crisis, the transatlantic allies 
have demonstrated an ability to close ranks, end discussions, and act for the greater good. 
That is why NATO was so successful for nearly fifty years. It is noteworthy that NATO’s 
long-term goal as an expression of transatlantic relations is not the preservation of its 
Cold War form and function, but the elimination of interstate war in Europe. Enlargement 
will help to achieve this.260 
The United States self-confidence in dealing with power is not new, but ist 
definition United States definition of international order is. Europe strongly desires a 
mutually beneficial working relationship with America. But the U.S. government has yet 
to initiate a dialogue with Europe, dismantling the U.S. unilateral image in order to 
support NATO efforts to adjust to current threats. The United States, as the lead nation in 
NATO, must bear the main burden in establishing and maintaining a strong and united 
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West. It has the same values and faces the same threats as Europe in a globalized world, 
and most European nations are willing to maintain the approved partnership. An outright 
NATO divorce would seriously damage both sides over the long run.261 But while the 
United States establishment needs to refine its diplomatic skills, Europe desperately 
needs to address its military concerns. As Robert Kagan asserts has argued Europe’s 
military weakness is integral to the “European interest in inhabiting a world where 
military strength does not matter, where international law and international institutions 
predominate.”262 As a matter of principle, this view is not wrong: what is perceived by 
the United States as weakness is, for many Europeans, the main political vision of 
attainment for the twenty-first century. 
The European undertaking to spend defense expenditures more wisely has failed 
to materialize in a substantial way,263 and closing the capability gap remains a key source 
of contention. The European Security Strategy and global-reach capability are important 
steps toward demonstrating that Europe recognizes the necessity for action. The EU must 
begin to close the transatlantic capability gap that exists between their forces. A renewal 
of the “EU Headline Goal 2010” and the development of small spearhead forces like the 
EU Rapid Reaction Forces264 are currently the best military options for Europe. They 
allow for an increased capability and interoperability while keeping costs to a minimum. 
In sum, the question now is: how can the transatlantic Alliance overcome this 
crisis? One answer is, through a political unification of Europe that also prevents 
uncontrollable able geopolitical overstretching. Second, the vigor inside the European 
Union must be focused and concentrated. A political organization of common interests 
must be found that avoids an environment in which countries would hardly ever act 
together. Outside interference, from either the United States or Russia has to be 
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minimized. Third, contrary to the self-motivated balance of power desired by France, 
Europe must cooperate with the United States as autonomous partner in NATO (though 
never fully equal), the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization. Finally, a new 
transatlantic dialogue with United States leadership, embedded in the international rule of 
law, has to begin with NATO as the primary locus of strategic consultation and 
coordination between the transatlantic partners. 
The rifts within Europe-United States transatlantic relations have been growing 
for some time, but none the less, the transatlantic relations will remain, even without an 
external threat, the main neural cord of European security. The Western world must 
reunite and renew its purpose in order to deal with the new threats of terrorism and the 
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